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Abstract 
This thesis explores the notion of empathy in David Foster Wallace’s short story 
collection Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999). Following a discussion of narrative 
empathy and theory of mind, an analysis of how empathy is portrayed on the diegetic 
level, i.e. between characters, is performed. Throughout this analysis, it is demonstrated 
that Wallace’s collection presents a nuanced picture of different kinds of empathy as well 
as the less admirable consequences that a capability to empathize can have. Because of 
this nuanced picture, the collection can be read as an argument for the insufficiency of an 
approach to empathy as inherently good.  
Furthermore, it is investigated how the use of the second-person pronoun affects 
the actual reader’s possibility to experience narrative empathy. By comparing how the 
second-person pronoun is used both in the collection’s second-person narratives and in a 
selection of the stories directing imperatives to an intradiegetic narratee, it is investigated 
how the use of the second-person pronoun can invite the actual reader to empathize with 
highly unsympathetic characters. Such narrative empathy, it is argued, can underscore an 
idea of human commonality. 
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1. Introduction 
In discussions of empathy today, it has become almost standard operating procedure to 
regard the ability to empathize as intrinsically and ethically good, as a capacity with pro-
social action and altruistic behavior as foregone consequences. To be able to empathize 
is commonly seen as an admirable capacity which helps the empathizer to somehow 
become a better, more considerate, fellow human being. As Rebecca N. Mitchell observes 
in her contribution to the 2014 critical collection Rethinking Empathy through Literature, 
in recent studies, “empathy is treated almost solely as an other-directed, altruistic gesture, 
and one which is inherently good” (123). If more people would be better empathizers, 
this approach seems to suggest, the world would be a better place. 
 Such a one-sided view of empathy is greatly challenged by David Foster 
Wallace’s Brief Interviews with Hideous Men.1 Published in 1999, Brief Interviews is a 
collection of short stories focused on exactly what the title suggests: hideous men. The 
book is filled to the brim with men who are profoundly misogynistic, who take every 
advantage there is to be taken of the people around them, and who provide detailed 
descriptions of exactly how much they hate their own children. As contradictory as it 
might sound, however, Brief Interviews is also a collection focused on empathy. The 
hideous characters inhabiting the collection constantly appeal for empathy from fellow 
characters, narratees, and (possibly) readers, asking them time and again to try to 
understand their minds’ hideous machinery. In addition, several of these men appear to 
possess very highly developed capacities for empathy. The hideous men in the 
collection’s title story, as well as other characters from other stories, frequently make use 
of their ability to imagine other characters’ minds – i.e. of their ability to empathize – for 
everything but noble reasons. By portraying the less admirable consequences that a well-
developed capacity for empathy can have, Wallace’s collection paints a pallet of the 
possible negative outcomes of empathy. 
 However, despite the bleak nuance of this pallet, empathy is not portrayed as 
inherently adverse in Brief Interviews. Rather, as I will go on to argue in my analysis, the 
collection can be read as presenting an alternative merit of narrative empathy. By a wealth 
                                                          
1 From hereon referred to as Brief Interviews. 
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of intricate narrative strategies, Wallace’s collection provides the actual reader with the 
possibility to empathize with highly unsympathetic characters. Several of the stories 
present the actual reader with the possibility to consider the invitation to empathize with 
the hideous men inhabiting the collection. Given this possibility, the book can be said to 
function as a test of the actual reader’s capability to empathize with the most abominable 
of characters in the most extreme of situations.  
 What I intend to investigate in this thesis is, first of all, how the portrayal of 
empathy in Brief Interviews complicates a routine notion of empathy as inherently good. 
Furthermore, I aim to show how particular aspects of the narratives can be read as 
invitations for the actual reader to empathize with highly unsympathetic characters. More 
specifically, I will begin by presenting a brief overview of the scholarly work published 
on Wallace and empathy today, before moving on to a discussion of the concept of 
narrative empathy. I will then begin the textual analysis by presenting a selective 
overview of the characters’ ability to empathize by analyzing their ability to use their 
theory of mind, accompanied by an examination of the different kinds of empathy they 
make use of. I will then go on to analyze two specific aspects from the wealth of narrative 
strategies that can influence the actual reader’s possibilities to empathize with the 
collection’s characters: the use of second-person narration and the use of imperatives 
directed to intradiegetic narratees. Through this investigation, I aim to show how these 
specific narrative strategies can invite the actual reader to empathize with the 
unsympathetic characters in the collection, and what merits a consideration of this 
invitation might have. 
 
1.1 Earlier Research 
As of today, Brief Interviews is a rather under-studied work in comparison with the 
current academic writing on Wallace’s oeuvre. The focus in the thriving field of what is 
often called Wallace studies has, perhaps reasonably, been centered on Wallace’s 
magnum opus Infinite Jest (1996) and the posthumously published The Pale King (2011). 
Notably, several of these works attend to the question of Wallace and empathy. For one, 
Toon Staes’ essay “Wallace and Empathy: A Narrative Approach”, published in 2014 in 
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David Foster Wallace and “The Long Thing”: New Essays on the Novels introduces 
fruitful ways of considering how Wallace creates empathy between reader, narrator, and 
(possibly) writer in his two last novels.2 By analyzing Wallace’s often demanding 
narrative strategies, Staes argues that his novels call for active reader participation in 
order to create both meaning and empathy. Similarly, in his book Reading as Therapy: 
What Contemporary Fiction Does for Middle-Class Americans, Timothy Aubrey claims 
that the metafictional device, for Wallace, “is a simple plea for empathy” as he 
investigates the addictive qualities of Infinite Jest (124).  
In addition, in the 2014 collection Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster 
Wallace and Philosophy, Patrick Horn investigates Wallace’s troubled relationship to the 
concept of solipsism. Drawing on the philosophical work of Wittgenstein, Horn argues 
for how Wallace’s own fiction contradicts the author’s view on the problem of solipsism, 
which he often discussed in interviews and essays. Horn analyzes the short story “Good 
Old Neon”, published in the collection Oblivion in 2004, and writes that the story “does 
not simply haunt us with sincere empathy but rather robustly connects us to the reality of 
the moral virtue of empathy”, and that “in this story Wallace displayed the true empathy 
that he thought was impossible” (248). In his article with the telling title “Acts of 
Empathy: David Foster Wallace’s Fiction”, Hugo Bowne-Anderson briefly discusses the 
very same short story. He mentions Wallace’s famous commencement speech, which he 
gave to the graduating students at Kenyon College in 2005, and summarizes one of the 
speech’s major points as “the importance of attempting to step outside of yourself, to put 
yourself in other people’s shoes, to empathise” (220). Bowne-Anderson links this part of 
Wallace’s speech to “Good Old Neon”, and claims that the misery of the story’s suicidal 
protagonist is partly due to his incapability to empathize in the manner exhorted in 
Wallace’s speech. As can be seen by these examples, the question of empathy in 
Wallace’s fiction is a recurring and recently flourishing subject across the field of Wallace 
studies.  
However, even though the academic work on Wallace tends to focus on the 
novels, Brief Interviews has of course not been completely neglected by scholars. Dan 
                                                          
2 An earlier version of this essay, with the title “Rewriting the Author: A Narrative Approach to Empathy 
in Infinite Jest and The Pale King”, was published in Studies in the Novel 44.4 (2012). 
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Tysdal discusses the opening story of Brief Interviews in connection to Raymond Carver 
and the school of minimalism in his article “Inarticulation and the Figure of Enjoyment: 
Raymond Carver’s Minimalism Meets David Foster Wallace’s ‘A Radically Condensed 
History of Postindustrial Life’” (2003). Furthermore, Adam Kelly brings up the question 
of where sincerity might be found in Wallace’s fiction in part by analyzing selected stories 
from Brief Interviews in his article “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in 
American Fiction”, published in the 2010 collection Consider David Foster Wallace 
edited by David Hering.  
Just as was the case with the scholarly work focused on Wallace’s novels, a 
notable portion of the work on Brief Interviews is dedicated to the collection’s evocation 
and treatment of empathy. Marshall Boswell’s influential Understanding David Foster 
Wallace (2003) includes chapters on both of Wallace’s short story collections published 
at the time. Although he does not use the specific term narrative empathy, much of 
Boswell’s discussion of Brief Interviews is centered on the concept of empathy. He writes 
that “Wallace wants to test the boundaries of our willingness to ‘empathize,’ since the 
men we, as readers, interview are, as they are advertised to be, hideous” (189). This is a 
view that corresponds with my overall argument about Brief Interviews being a test of the 
reader’s ability for narrative empathy, and Boswell’s analysis will be introduced in more 
detail throughout the thesis. Charles B. Harris, who once hired Wallace as a professor at 
Illinois State University, briefly but importantly continues this discussion of empathy in 
Brief Interviews in his remembrance article “David Foster Wallace: ‘That Distinctive 
Singular Stamp of Himself’” (2010). “For David”, Harris writes, “other-directed acts of 
unostentatious empathy were an ethical imperative. And that ethic enfolds into his 
aesthetic” (172). Furthermore, in Hering’s collection mentioned above, Iannis Goerlandt 
discusses the function of Wallace’s different annotation systems in his fiction and non-
fiction. Goerlandt writes about reader annoyance in Brief Interviews and, as I will discuss 
briefly in chapter 4.3, argues for how the lengthy footnotes in several of the short stories 
ultimately depend on reader participation to create meaning. A third piece from Hering’s 
collection worth mentioning in connection to Brief Interviews and empathy is 
Christoforos Diakoulakis’ “’Quote unquote love… a type of scotopia’: David Foster 
Wallace’s Brief Interviews with Hideous Men”. In this piece, Diakoulakis investigates the 
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question of love and its connection to narration and mediation in one part of the 
collection’s recurring title story. 
One essay of particular significance in connection to how a reader of Wallace 
might experience empathy in his fiction is Zadie Smith’s “Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men: The Difficult Gifts of David Foster Wallace”, published in her collection of essays 
Changing My Mind: Occasional Essays (2009). Smith discusses Wallace as a moral 
writer and emphasizes the demanding effort any reader of Wallace has to put in when 
reading his fiction. She explains how “[t]o appreciate Wallace, you need to really read 
him – and then you need to reread him”, and her analogy of a Wallace reader and a 
musician is especially striking (261, emphasis in the original). Smith describes how 
Wallace’s “reader needs to think of herself as a musician … electing to play. First there 
is practice, then competency at the instrument, then spending time with the sheet music, 
then playing it over and over”, a description that appears very appropriate in the case of 
an author using as many demanding narrative techniques as Wallace (261). 
Mary K. Holland provides detailed analyses of Wallace’s short story collection 
in her book Succeeding Postmodernism and in her article “Mediated Immediacy in Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men”, both published in 2013. Holland offers an innovative way 
of regarding fiction produced in the wake of postmodernism – post-postmodern fiction if 
you so will – and her analysis of Wallace as a producer of such fiction is partly based on 
a discussion of narrative empathy. The focus of this thesis will not be on the much debated 
question of whether Wallace’s fiction overcomes postmodernism or not, but Holland’s 
discussion of this issue will nevertheless prove important because of her focus on the 
importance of the reader in any possible solution to what she perceives as the postmodern 
problem. This problem, as Holland sees it, is largely due to the fact that postmodern and 
poststructural fiction has somehow removed literature from the real world. According to 
Holland, this removal has resulted in a “need for a method of representation via language 
that can invoke the real we miss and need in order to reconnect literature to the world we 
live in, rather than just the one we theorize” (Succeeding 165). The proposed solution to 
this need, which Holland sees as emerging in a selection of contemporary literature, is 
closely connected to both the fiction and its readers’ treatment of and relationship to 
emotions and empathy.  
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Holland introduces the term “poststructural realism” (sometimes termed 
“metafictive realism”), which she describes as a way to use narrative techniques 
traditionally connected to poststructuralism toward the ends of traditional realism 
(Succeeding 7). Poststructural realism, Holland claims, can “allow the reader the 
pleasures and meaningful products of realist fiction” in a poststructural fictional 
landscape that have “long seemed to substitute language tricks for meaningfulness”, but 
only if the reader chooses to read it in such a way (Succeeding 176). Literature can thus 
be reconnected to the world we live in, and not only “the one we theorize”, only if the 
reader actively chooses to aid in this reconnection. In a discussion of metafiction in the 
twentieth century, Holland asserts that “whether we read in it the solipsism or the longing 
for empathic connection depends on how we choose to read these complicated texts that 
struggle against themselves as much as they struggle against the humanism they aimed to 
break away from” (Succeeding 165). The question of whether postmodern techniques are 
used for what Holland would call anti-humanist purposes or whether they are used to 
create empathetic connections thus appears to depend very much on the reader. There are, 
of course, possible clues for how to interpret such techniques in the text itself (otherwise 
it would be rather difficult to produce an analysis of the text at all). However, as will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4, an active choice by the actual reader is as essential 
to a possible experience of narrative empathy as it is for the interpretation of metafiction. 
Another scholarly work discussing Wallace in the context of post-
postmodernism is Nicoline Timmer’s published dissertation, Do You Feel It Too: The 
Post-Postmodern Syndrome in American Fiction at the Turn of the Millennium (2010). 
Timmer’s analysis concerns the sense of the self as presented in three contemporary 
American works of fiction, Infinite Jest being one of them. However, she also includes a 
discussion about the short story “Octet” published in Brief Interviews, as well as an 
overall discussion concerning the role of empathy in contemporary fiction. Similar to 
Holland, Timmer views the use of postmodern techniques in contemporary fiction as 
having “a different function” from the same techniques used in postmodern fiction (360). 
A part of this difference can be explained by examining how post-postmodern fiction tries 
to break away from what have become almost conventional postmodern techniques. One 
of the more significant techniques in this case is postmodernism’s tendency to foreground 
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the deception of how fiction can provide the reader access to a fictional mind. Timmer 
argues that:  
it has always been a special feature of fiction that one is able to enter another 
(fictional of course) mind, get the ‘inside’ perspective, is able to think and feel 
with an ‘other’. This was a (modern) narrative convention, but one that was 
‘mocked’ in postmodern texts … Bewilderment at how to ‘go on’ from there is 
what seems to drive Wallace’s stories. (115, emphasis in the original)   
This is of course a view on postmodern fiction that can be contested. However, the 
question of whether or not fiction can provide the reader with the opportunity of entering 
another’s mind will prove crucial to the idea of narrative empathy.  
At the end of her dissertation, Timmer has created a list of some distinctive traits 
of the post-postmodern novel. Among other characteristics, she claims that “a ‘what if’ 
mentality oozes from the post-postmodern novel, a ‘willingness to belief’”, and that “the 
post-postmodern novel hinges on creating empathy (between characters, between narrator 
and characters, between narrators or characters and narratee, between fictional figures 
and the flesh and blood ‘real’ reader)” (359-61). The emphasis is placed on both the 
importance of empathy on different levels of the text and, again, on the reader’s crucial 
bearing on this construction. In her discussion of a short story published in Brief 
Interviews, Timmer claims that “[w]hether or not it works, whether or not the 
‘communicative urgency’ is transferred at all, depends very much on the reader here. It 
is the reader who is called upon” (113, emphasis in the original). These post-postmodern 
texts can include cues for empathy and invitations to a “what if” mentality, but the 
“willingness to belief” always and ultimately has to be put in by the actual reader.   
What these essays and articles on Wallace and empathy appear to have in 
common is a persistent emphasis on the importance of empathy and an active, effortful, 
choice made by the reader. Because of this emphasis, they all give reason and leave room 
for further investigation of more precisely how Wallace’s fiction might evoke empathy in 
the actual reader. What I will focus on in the following analysis is therefore, first, how 
empathy is portrayed in Brief Interviews, i.e. whether the characters are described as able 
to empathize or not. After such an analysis, it is possible to go into an investigation of 
how the actual reader might interpret the narratives. In order to do this, I will investigate 
what possible cues and clues there are in the text that might point in any direction as to 
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what interpretative choices the reader is asked to make regarding narrative empathy. As 
I will emphasize throughout the fourth chapter of this thesis, the question of whether or 
not Wallace’s penultimate short story collection succeeds in evoking narrative empathy 
is strongly connected to the need for active reader participation.  
 
2. Narrative Empathy  
Before moving on to the textual analysis, however, a discussion of the term narrative 
empathy is needed. According to narrative theorist Suzanne Keen, “narrative empathy is 
the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or 
imagining narratives of another’s situation or condition” (“Narrative Empathy” paragraph 
1). Throughout her influential book on the subject, Empathy and the Novel (2007), Keen 
explains how empathy is always dependent on the act of perspective-taking and imagining 
another’s state of mind. She also stresses that the very fictionality of literature might in 
fact induce this act of perspective-taking, because “[w]hile the fact of human others’ 
perspectives and motivations activates our caution, the fictiveness of characters’ mental 
states invites our participation and playful engagement” (34). Another way of seeing this 
difference between fiction and real life is that the perspectives of human others in real life 
not only makes us cautious, but is in fact impossible, while understanding a character’s 
mind in fiction might be possible. As Keen herself puts it, “[b]ooks often tacitly ask 
readers to step into a character’s shoes” (Empathy 18). Since fiction is not only able to 
ask readers to step into characters’ shoes and – I argue – minds, but actually makes this 
kind of stepping into shoes and its adherent mind-reading feasible, the perspective-taking 
induced by fiction might be a kind of perspective-taking that is not available outside the 
boundaries of fiction. Since fiction is able to provide its readers with representations of 
characters’ minds, fiction might also be able to present the reader with a greater possibility 
for perspective-taking than real life situations. I.e., while fiction can allow us to, so to 
speak, read a character’s represented thoughts at a specific moment, real life situations do 
not provide us with the representation of other humans’ thoughts. We might still, of 
course, deduce the thoughts of other flesh-and-blood persons by reading their behavior, 
but these thoughts are not presented to us the way they can be presented by fiction. 
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A cognitive view on the differences and similarities of empathy as experienced 
in real life situations and in fiction reading is provided by Patrick Colm Hogan, who 
includes cognitive science in his study of narratives. According to Hogan, “[t]o know that 
something is fictional is to make a judgment that it does not exist. But existence 
judgments are cortical. They have relatively little to do with our emotional response to 
anything” (Cognitive 185). Hogan stresses the fact that our emotional system works very 
much in the same way whether we treat actual real-life situations or fictional narratives, 
because our responses to the different situations still rely “on the same cognitive 
architecture”, and “the human mind proceeds in the same way, whether it is dealing with 
nature or with art” (Cognitive 42, 116). In the same sense, E.M. Dadlez emphasizes that 
how readers understand fictional characters is strikingly similar to how they understand 
real persons by asking “[i]f the act of imagining a human situation, and construing it in a 
particular way in doing so, is not irrational in itself, what further ground is left on the 
basis of which to call emotional responses to fictions irrational?” (39). The understanding 
of flesh-and-blood persons always has to be based on guesses and deductions since any 
direct mind-reading is not possible, but, as mentioned, such mind-reading appears to be 
more readily provided by fiction.  
A thorny question often brought up when discussing narrative empathy is the 
question of whether it can be said to serve a purpose since it seldom leads to altruistic 
action. The question appears to boil down to: if readers do not take action in the real world 
after having had an empathetic reading experience, then what is the point of narrative 
empathy? In her research on college students’ responses to fiction, Keen has found that 
successful instances of narrative empathy rarely lead to action or changed behavior after 
the reading experience (Empathy 107). She calls this the “underperformance of fiction” 
and blames it partly on the “very textuality of novels” (Empathy 108), and suggests that 
“the contract of fictionality offers a no-strings-attached opportunity for emotional 
transactions of great intensity” (Empathy 168). This opportunity, Keen argues, presents 
the novel-reader with the opportunity to “enjoy empathy freely without paying society 
back in altruism” (Empathy 168). However, to regard fiction that does not lead to 
altruistic, pro-social action as under-performing seems to me to be a case of both holding 
fiction to too high a standard and valuing what empathetic reading experiences actually 
can achieve too little. In a response to Keen’s worries that her reading about the victims 
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of the Rwanda massacre did not lead to anything more than the writing of a few checks 
(Empathy xxi), Hogan writes that this view of fiction assumes a heroic model and 
continues saying that:  
heroism is the wrong model anyway. Cultivating skills in empathy and 
encouraging effortful simulation that promotes empathy are first of all valuable 
in ordinary acts of daily life … Judging the benefits of emotional skills by 
heroism is like judging the benefits of jogging by reference to escaping 
unharmed from muggers. (Affective 246) 
Hogan’s emphasis on an “effortful simulation” that can affect the reader’s everyday life 
indicates that fiction can be useful for the reader after the reading experience, even if it 
does not lead to altruistic action. In concordance with this argument, cognitive 
psychologist Keith Oatley states that his research group has “discovered that fiction at its 
best isn’t just enjoyable. It measurably enhances our ability to empathize with other 
people and connect with something larger than ourselves”, and that “[t]hrough stories, 
selfhood can expand” (“Changing Our Minds” n. pag.). In a similar fashion, Oatley also 
suggests that “[w]orks of fiction draw on our skills of empathy, and allow us to practice 
these skills” (“A Feeling for Fiction” n. pag.). While I do not mean to suggest that reading 
fiction automatically, necessarily, and somewhat mysteriously makes readers into better 
persons, fiction reading can at least theoretically be seen as a practice dependent upon the 
reader’s capacity for empathy. As will be argued and exemplified in the forthcoming 
analysis, fiction reading can also, in particular cases, be understood as a potential 
developing of this capacity for empathy and perspective-taking.  
Additionally, the connection between fiction reading and a developing of the 
reader’s capacity for empathy is strongly connected to what Wallace has expressed about 
what he thinks great fiction can achieve. In a today rather famous interview with Larry 
McCaffery, Wallace explains how, as he sees it, “[w]e all suffer alone in the real world; 
true empathy is impossible. But if a piece of fiction can allow us imaginatively to identify 
with characters’ pain, we might then also more easily conceive of others identifying with 
our own” (22). He goes on to claim that this process makes readers of this kind of fiction 
“less alone inside”, a valid reason for why narrative empathy can serve a purpose outside 
the reading experience (22). Implied in both Oatley’s and Wallace’s comments is an 
emphasis on the human commonality that can be underscored by fiction that elicits 
empathy. Through empathetic reading experiences, it appears to be possible for readers 
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to acknowledge an affinity between themselves and (fictional) others and, as a 
consequence, to feel less isolated as they recognize an idea of human commonality. If 
successful, fiction that calls for empathy for particularly hideous characters would then 
be even more convincing of this idea of an underlying human commonality, as will be 
discussed in chapter 4. For now, it might suffice to invoke what Dadlez has discussed as 
fiction’s ethical purpose. Dadlez argues that fiction is “ethically important” because it 
develops the reader’s capacity of attention and perspective-taking (194-95). She writes 
that “[e]mpathetic engagement with fiction can be and often is ethically significant 
precisely because it allows us to explore experiences we have not had from perspectives 
that are not wholly our own but that we can make our own” (195). Again, emphasis is 
placed on how perspective-taking can allow the reader to, as it were, enter the mind of 
another through the representation of that mind provided by fiction, and how such 
perspective-taking can lead to a feeling of connection.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, to discuss empathy in ethical terms 
is not entirely unproblematic. As can be seen by the above examples, discussions of 
empathy often appear to take for granted that to empathize is a noble activity with 
automatically positive consequences.3 Such routine linking of empathy and the ethically 
good leads to discussions that risk overlooking several aspects of empathy. More 
specifically, such routine linking often neglects to consider the idea that the act of 
empathizing might have negative consequences. As Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. 
Kim observe in their introduction to the already mentioned Rethinking Empathy through 
Literature, “the romanticization of literary empathy as a straightforward ethical or 
political good is not only flawed but also potentially dangerous. Put simply, empathy has 
the potential to help and harm” (11, emphasis in the original). When regarding a work of 
fiction like Brief Interviews, the harmful potential of empathy soon stands evident. As 
will be exemplified in chapter 3.2-3.4, the characters in Wallace’s collection frequently 
use their capacity to empathize with others and imagine these others’ minds for everything 
but ethically noble reasons. It thus becomes evident that it is insufficient to regard 
empathy as inherently positive. In fact, when considering the possible negative outcomes 
                                                          
3 See Hammond and Kim’s introduction to Rethinking Empathy through Literature (2014) for a 
comprehensive historical overview of the concept of empathy.  
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of empathy, it appears as empathy per se might not be suited to be judged by ethical 
measurements at all. If, instead of discussing empathy in ethical terms, one views it as 
plainly an ability to imagine somebody else’s situation by perspective-taking, it becomes 
easier to focus on the actual act of imagining required for empathy to occur, and, in the 
case of narrative empathy, on the textual cues for it. It is not the fact of empathy, but the 
way in which empathy is exercised that determines the ethical value of the act. What 
determines the ethical value when it comes to narrative empathy, then, is how the actual 
reader exercises the opportunity to empathize with a fictional character. 
There are two additional important aspects concerning narrative empathy that 
risk being overlooked if empathy is regarded as inherently good. One is the fact that there 
are different kinds of empathy. As I will discuss in chapter 3.4, Hogan introduces three 
kinds of empathy that provide fruitful ways of analyzing both empathy between 
characters and between readers and characters. All acts of empathy are not the same, and, 
consequently, all experiences of narrative empathy are not the same. The second aspect 
of importance here is what Eric Leake calls “difficult empathy” (175). Leake claims that 
empathy for “those who are seen as most deserving of our empathy”, i.e. “victims of 
abuse and oppression”, is an easy kind of empathy. Such empathy, Leake explains, might 
in fact have negative consequences as it makes readers complacent in their view of 
themselves as “caring people” and therefore does not challenge either the readers’ 
identities or “the privileges of empathy that rest with the more powerful and more 
comfortable” (175). Difficult empathy, on the other hand, “pushes the limits of our 
understanding in reaching out to those with whom we might not otherwise wish contact 
or association” (176). A recognition of the possibility for readers to empathize with 
characters they initially would disregard as unworthy of their empathy is crucial to the 
understanding of a work such as Brief Interviews, which often places its characters’ 
hideousness in the center. As Leake mentions, and as I will argue throughout chapter 4, 
this type of narrative empathy can furthermore have merits of its own. 
One aspect often emphasized as important in the discussion of narrative empathy 
is character identification. In her list of hypotheses regarding narrative empathy, Keen 
states that “character identification often invites empathy”, and that “spontaneous 
empathy for a fictional character’s feelings opens the way for character identification” 
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(Empathy 70). However, character identification does not appear to require concrete 
similarities between the actual reader and the character empathized with. Since there 
presumably is a rather small part of Brief Interviews’ audience who initially wants to 
regard themselves as similar to the often remarkably hideous characters inhabiting the 
collection, this aspect is of great importance. Keen describes how character identification 
invites empathy “even when the character and reader differ from each other in all sorts of 
practical and obvious ways” (Empathy 70). Similarly, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Narrative Theory, Ralf Schneider mentions that “for the reader of a novel to relate 
emotionally to a character’s hopes, joys, fears, plights, etc., it is not necessary that he or 
she share any trait with that character at all” (136). This argument is essential to the 
discussion of empathy in Brief Interviews for the simple reason that narrative empathy 
would be very much of an exception if it required strong similarities between character 
and reader in this case. Character identification might sometimes arguably play a great 
role for inviting the reader to experience narrative empathy, but it does not appear to be 
a prerequisite for empathetic reading experiences. 
Ethical agreement with the fictional character empathized with does not appear 
to be a necessary condition for narrative empathy to occur either. This, again, is important 
for the discussion of empathy in a piece of fiction as preoccupied with ethically dubious 
characters as Brief Interviews. Dadlez writes:  
Empathy with characters, while one’s focus derives in part from one’s evaluative 
beliefs, is not necessarily circumscribed either by an overall ethical assessment 
of a character or by some assumption of overall commonality between our 
normative judgments and those of a character. Empathy rests not on these factors 
but on our ability to imagine having the beliefs and experiences of another and 
thus on our ability to imaginatively inhabit the situations of others. (190) 
It thus appears as imagination is far more important than ethical agreement for narrative 
empathy to be evoked. The fact that readers are capable of empathizing with morally 
dubious characters might even strengthen the theory that character identification does not 
demand significant similarities between character and reader, as Keen has suggested 
(Empathy 75-6). This sort of narrative empathy appears to depend on both authorial 
empathy and active focus by the reader. Keen suggests that “[i]f an author has felt with 
her creations as she imagines them, not just reserving emotional investment for favored 
protagonists, then the opportunity to bond temporarily with monsters, madmen, and 
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villains can be regarded not as anomalous, but as a standard feature of fiction” (Empathy 
131). Although I do not believe that whether or not a reader empathizes with a character 
necessarily depends on the author’s feelings toward that particular character, the word 
“opportunity” is crucial here. This word choice implies that to empathize with a morally 
dubious character is a chance rather than a risk. Dadlez argues that “empathy can provide 
new insights into the experience and motivation of others, and can thus lead us to a new 
awareness of or alteration in our existing normative judgment” (191). To bond and 
empathize with fictional creations of morally questionable character can thus possibly be 
experienced as beneficial by the reader.  
That, however, is not to say that empathizing with morally dubious characters is 
always beneficial, and thus positive, for the reader. Just as empathy per se might not be 
suitable to regard as inherently positive, the fact that a reader empathizes with a fictional 
character does not automatically lead to positive outcomes. What is interesting is to 
investigate how a piece of fiction is able to induce empathy with characters, both 
sympathetic and not. It should also be noted, however, that whether or not such requests 
for empathy for unsympathetic characters are successful heavily depends on several 
factors connected to the communicative situation of the narrative and how – and by whom 
– the characters are portrayed. The communicative situation of a narrative, together with 
the specific narrative strategies used, are indeed of immeasurable importance for whether 
the actual reader will experience narrative empathy or not. In this thesis, a selected portion 
of the narrative strategies with distinct possible consequences for narrative empathy in 
Brief Interviews will be analyzed in chapter 4.   
In her investigations about narrative empathy gathered from email discussions 
about novel reading and empathy, Keen shows that to empathize with “unsavory 
characters” might be regarded as one of the more essential aspects of fiction reading 
(Empathy 74). Her conclusion from these reader responses is that such an “interpretation 
recuperates empathy for nasty characters to the broad project of character education for 
tolerance, by emphasizing the humanity of the vicious or the risible” (Empathy 74). While 
I do not wish to suggest that the function of narrative empathy in Brief Interviews is to 
close the gap between the reader’s ethical judgment and that of the indeed both nasty, 
unsavory, and vicious characters of the collection, the focus on a broadening of the 
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reader’s mind and Keen’s mentioning of how empathy for “unsavory characters” 
emphasizes humanity is crucial to the discussion of empathy in Wallace’s collection. 
Dadlez introduces a theory of how readers’ ability to empathize with a character whose 
moral standards differ considerably from their own depends on the actual reader’s 
capacity to imagine this character’s beliefs in isolation. If enough attention is paid to the 
fictional situation, Dadlez claims, “it is quite possible that even paragons of probity and 
virtue can imagine having some of the beliefs and desires of the blackest fictional villain” 
(190). As I will soon go on to discuss in chapter 3.2, this kind of selective imagining of 
another (in this case fictional) person’s mind is frequently asked for by the characters and 
narrators in Brief Interviews.  
What stands out time and again in the discussion of empathy, both narrative and 
“real”, is the importance of perspective-taking and the act of imagining. Dadlez points 
out that “[i]magination is involved in empathetic emotion both when one empathizes with 
fictional entities and when one empathizes with actual persons. To empathize is to adopt 
a different point of vantage in the actual or fictional world” (7). She also argues that this 
act of “imaginatively inhabit[ing] the worlds of others” has significance not only in that 
it “permits us to imagine that a life could be lived in a certain way but in that it enables 
us to contemplate how it might be to live just such a life” (7-8). Narrative empathy thus 
appears to enable readers to view the world they inhabit from a perspective different than 
their own. The outcome of such perspective-taking need not be either unproblematic or 
necessarily positive, not the least since it can be argued that to imagine the beliefs and 
desires of cruel characters might in fact have negative consequences. Nonetheless, in 
order to understand more fully how narrative empathy functions, it is important to note 
that fiction can invite perspective-taking with unsympathetic characters of morally 
dubious standards as well. Oatley argues for how narratives can allow us, as readers, “to 
extend ourselves into situations we have never experienced, feel for people very different 
from ourselves, and begin to understand such people in ways that we may never have 
thought possible” (“A Feeling for Fiction” n. pag.). The extension of the self referred to 
by Oatley is similar to Leake’s argument about how “[d]ifficult empathy fosters the 
development of more expansive identities that incorporate the best and worst of people” 
(184). Empathetic reading experiences, when successful, appear to allow the reader to 
enter into a game of “what if”, where she for a moment is able to imagine the world from 
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a perspective not her own.4 If the perspective the reader is invited to share belongs to a 
character of the unsympathetic or even hideous kind, the act of empathy might become 
more difficult, but it might also have particular merits as it can extend the reader’s notion 
of herself.  
 
3. Characters and Empathy 
To understand the empathetic appeal of a fictional work, I find it necessary to first of all 
understand how the work in question portrays empathy. Empathy in fiction can be said to 
work on two levels. Firstly, there is the diegetic level: the way in which characters are 
depicted as empathizing or not empathizing with each other within the narrative. 
Secondly, there is the question of how empathy is created in the reading experience: of 
how an actual reader might perceive the characters depicted, and hence whether or not 
the actual reader experiences narrative empathy. How empathy is created in the reading 
experience is, as mentioned, determined by several factors in the text, one of the more 
crucial being the mode of narration. The effects that different modes of narration might 
have on the actual reader’s possible experience of narrative empathy will be discussed in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. Since such a discussion relies partially on how the characters are 
depicted in the fiction, an analysis of how (or if) the characters in Brief Interviews 
empathize will provide groundwork for that discussion. Although these two levels rarely 
stay separate, but rather tend to both depend upon and cross-fertilize one another, I will 
attempt to keep them separated and begin on the diegetic level. By investigating which of 
the collection’s characters are able to empathize with others and which are not, my aim 
is to provide a lucid picture of how empathy is portrayed in Brief Interviews. For this 
reason, I will begin my analysis of empathy in Brief Interviews with an overview of 
empathy on the diegetic level and investigate how it is portrayed as experienced – and 
used – by the characters.  
                                                          
4 In concordance with established practice and because the diegetic “reader” in some of the collection’s 
stories is referred to with the female pronoun, the actual reader will be referred to with the female pronoun 
throughout this thesis. However, this pronoun is used in a generic way and is not supposed to imply that 
the actual reader of Wallace’s collection is gendered. 
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Given the emphasis on perspective-taking’s importance for empathy discussed 
in chapter 2, the focus on perspective in the fiction appears to be a good place to start. 
Many of the characters and narrators in Brief Interviews are practically obsessed with 
perspective. They talk about it, they appeal for different kinds of it, and they (in the case 
of narrators) play with it. In her discussion about one of the collection’s first stories, 
“Forever Overhead”, Holland states that “[f]rom the end of the board and the story, 
perspective is everything” (“Mediated” 113). This turns out to be a statement that can be 
seen as fitting not only for the end of that particular story, but rather for the majority of 
the collection. When it comes to empathizing, perspective is indeed everything. Without 
the act of perspective-taking, or, to put it another way, without the act of stepping into 
somebody else’s shoes, empathy simply is not possible.  
As it so happens, the act of perspective-taking is closely connected to a concept 
often used in cognitive science when discussing empathy: theory of mind. In her book on 
the subject, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006), literary scholar 
Lisa Zunshine describes theory of mind as a sort of mind-reading (6). She explains the 
concept as our “ability to explain people’s behavior in terms of their thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, and desires” (6), and argues that one reason why humans tend to enjoy reading 
fiction might be because it allows us to train and confirm our theory of mind ability (18). 
In addition, Oatley discusses how theory of mind “involves simulating the minds of other 
people: imagining what they are thinking and feeling” (“Changing Our Minds” n. pag.). 
This does indeed seem very similar to what fiction often invites and enables the reader to 
do, and the importance of the actual reader’s theory of mind ability in the case of Brief 
Interviews will be discussed in chapter 4. For now, however, it is essential to note that 
successful theory of mind is dependent upon the person or character’s ability to imagine 
someone else’s perspective. In order to be able to explain another’s thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, and desires, it is first of all necessary to imagine those thoughts, feelings, beliefs, 
and desires. In other words, it is necessary to imagine the situation of the one empathized 
with from his or her perspective. Whether or not this explanation of another individual’s 
mind is accurate is of minor importance here, since the vital part of this discussion will 
be the act of imagining and perspective-taking, and not its potential concordance with the 
actual mind imagined. Furthermore, the concept of theory of mind can be considered 
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advantageous compared to the more usual concept of empathy when discussing the act of 
perspective-taking, since it moves away from empathy’s positive connotations.  
As will be argued in the following subchapters, the characters who are described 
as able to view situations from a perspective other than their own in Brief Interviews are 
also the characters able to use their theory of mind ability to empathize with others. 
Holland describes how the collection’s “imagined acts of empathy begin by taking a 
perspective outside of the self, and in the end it is this shifting, even doubling or 
multiplying, of vision that the collection diagnoses and enables, that it greets with terror 
and gratitude” (“Mediated” 127, emphasis in the original). The mentioning of terror and 
gratitude is important here, since it implies what was briefly mentioned in the 
introduction: that instances of empathy by perspective-taking rarely are simple, one-
sided, or even necessarily positive in Brief Interviews. Or, rather, the consequences of 
empathy are rarely depicted as simple, one-sided, or even necessarily positive in Brief 
Interviews. As will be seen by the examples provided below, empathy and a developed 
capacity for theory of mind is a complex issue in Wallace’s collection and might, amongst 
other destructive consequences, cause depression and serve as a great means for 
manipulation.  
 
3.1 Perspective Is Everything 
The first story where perspective is frequently brought up and emphasized is the 
collection’s third piece, “Forever Overhead”. In this story, perspective is not only 
“everything” in that it is important to the main character, but also in that it is alluded to 
time and again by the narrator in this second-person narrative.5 The story describes the 
main character’s thirteenth birthday at a public swimming pool and his decision to jump 
from a springboard into the water, and possibly also (metaphorically) into adulthood. 
When the boy has finally reached the board, the reader is told that “[t]he board is long. 
From where you stand it seems to stretch off into nothing”, and the next paragraph begins 
                                                          
5 The necessary question of by what means the mode of narration in this second-person narrative affects 
the reader’s possible experience of narrative empathy will, for reasons detailed above, be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
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with “[l]ooked at another way, the same board is just a long thin flat thing covered with 
a rough white plastic stuff” (13). The fact that the board is frequently described in relation 
to its surroundings underscores the idea that how something appears always depends on 
the perspective it is viewed from. Similarly, when the boy has finally climbed the ladder 
and is about to jump, his new perspective is accentuated when it is said that “you knew 
that from below you wouldn’t look nearly so high overhead. You see now how high 
overhead you are. You knew from down there no one could tell” (15). Such descriptions 
emphasize the new knowledge that can be provided by a new perspective, and the 
relativity of everything is made poignantly clear later on the same page when the narrator 
describes that “the water, of course, is only soft when you’re inside it” (15). This laconic 
observation is then followed by a series of questions, beginning “[s]o which is the lie? 
Hard or soft? Silence or time?” which is immediately answered with “[t]he lie is that it’s 
one or the other” (16). One way of reading this statement is to see it as a discussion of 
perspective. The water is neither soft nor hard, because the answer will always depend on 
who is asking, and from what perspective the question is asked. The answer, “[t]he lie is 
that it’s one or the other”, implies that the water is both soft and hard, that neither 
perspective is more true or false than the other. It all depends on if you are in the water 
or not. 
 The character referred to as “You” in “Forever Overhead” is also, in 
concordance with my hypothesis regarding perspective-taking’s importance for empathy 
and theory of mind in this collection, one of the few characters described as empathizing 
with others in the stories. Holland writes about “the boy’s own repeated, simply and 
deeply felt moments of empathy” (“Mediated” 113). These moments of empathy are 
perhaps most easily identified when it is described how the hurt-looking legs of a big 
woman in front of the boy on the ladder make “you feel like your own legs hurt”, but that 
is not the only example of the main character feeling with others (11). When the boy 
begins to climb the ladder to the board, the first steps are described as follows: “The dents 
feel deep and they hurt. You feel heavy. How the big woman over you must feel” (11). A 
clear example of this boy imagining what another character is feeling, these short lines 
can be read as an instance of a character trying to understand someone else’s feelings by 
using his theory of mind skills. Only a page later, the boy goes on to imagine the same 
woman’s thoughts instead of her feelings, as it is described how “[i]t does not seem good, 
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the way she disappears into a time that passes before she sounds. Like a stone down a 
well. But you think she did not think so” (12). Here, the boy is imagining another person’s 
thoughts by stepping out of his own perspective, an activity that will reoccur in the 
collection.  
The second character able to imagine someone else’s thoughts is the man about 
to commit adultery in “Think”. This story, just over two pages long, is interesting because 
it portrays two characters with what could be called diametrically opposite capabilities of 
empathy and theory of mind. Perspective is not discussed in as verbatim a way as in 
“Forever Overhead”, but it is still of crucial importance to both the story and the main 
character, who appears to have a very fine capacity of using his theory of mind ability to 
understand someone else’s mind. As the woman with whom the man is about to commit 
adultery turns around to close the door, the narrator describes how the man in that moment 
“realizes she’s replaying a scene from some movie she loves” (72-3). Moreover, the man 
is actually able to imagine not only what the woman thinks in general, but what she thinks 
about him and his behavior as well. In the very beginning of the story, it is described how 
“[h]e thinks to kneel. But he knows what she might think if he kneels” (72). When the 
man has eventually knelt down, allegedly to pray instead of completing the adultery he is 
in the middle of, he tells the woman that “[i]t’s not what you think”, and then reiterates 
this assurance by adding “[i]t’s not what you think I’m afraid of” (73-4). The man appears 
to be able to view the admittedly rather absurd situation from the perspective of the 
woman and, thus, he is also able to use his theory of mind ability to imagine what she 
thinks of the situation.  
As a contrast, the woman in the story does not show any willingness when it 
comes to understanding the man’s thoughts, feelings, and awkward behavior. The narrator 
describes how “[s]he could try, for just a moment, to imagine what is happening in his 
head”, but this is apparently not something that the woman has any ambition to try (73). 
Instead of attempting to understand what is happening in the man’s head as he kneels to 
pray, she asks “a three-word question” (73). Since it makes the man’s “forehead pucker 
as he winces”, it does not seem very likely that the question is of the understanding kind 
(73). The woman is aware of how the situation might look from an outside perspective, 
“[s]he’s now aware of just how she’s standing, how silly it might look through a window”, 
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but this is a very self-centered form of perspective-taking (73-4). She is willing to apply 
an outside perspective of how she would appear if anyone saw her at that particular 
moment, but she is not willing to step outside of her own perspective and consider the 
situation from the man’s point of view. The story ends with a “what if” situation, where 
the narrator asks “[a]nd what if she joined him on the floor, just like this, clasped in 
supplication: just this way” (74). By ending the story with what indeed seems to be a 
rather unlikely closure to the episode, due to the woman’s resistance to imagine the man’s 
mind, the merits that might come with considering a mind other than one’s own are hinted 
at. 
Another character who appears to be able to do just this, to consider a mind other 
than his own, is the narrator and main character in the collection’s very next story, 
“Signifying Nothing”. In this story, perspective is again brought up as a key ingredient 
needed in order to achieve this kind of consideration. As the narrator describes how he 
asks his father about the sudden and traumatic memory the story centers on, he 
underscores his awareness about how this must appear to his father by stating that “[i]n 
the van, out of (from his perspective) nowhere, I suddenly tell my father I just had recently 
remembered the day he came down and waggled his dick in my face when I was a little 
kid” (77). When the narrator eventually starts to come to terms with his father’s reaction 
to this accusation, it is because he recognizes that other people, in this case his father, 
might view things from a perspective different than his own. He describes how he slowly 
begins to understand that: 
It was possible that the whole incident was so weird and unexplained, that my 
father, psychologically, blocked it out of his memory, and that when I, out of 
(from his point of view) nowhere, brought it up to him in the van, he did not 
remember ever doing something as bizarre and unexplained as coming down and 
threateningly waggling his dick at a little kid[.] (79) 
Explanations like this one show that this narrator is able to imagine the thoughts of 
someone else by stepping outside of his own perspective.   
This nameless narrator might in fact be one of the collection’s best examples of 
the merits a highly-developed capacity of theory of mind can provide. It is of course 
possible, and perhaps even probable, that he is an unreliable narrator wishing to portray 
himself in an admirable way. Yet, if bracketing that suspicion for a moment, one might 
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instead regard his alleged ability for theory of mind in more detail. This narrator is 
constantly trying to understand his father’s behavior and thoughts by using his theory of 
mind skills, as can be seen in passages such as the following: “I kept trying to think about 
why my father would do something like that, and what he could have been thinking of, 
like, what it could have meant” (76-7). Time and again, this character attempts to 
understand his father’s mind by considering the situation from his father’s perspective 
and by reading his father’s behavior. After describing the accusation in the van, the 
narrator mentions how his father “does not say one thing, however this look he gives me 
says it all”, and then gives a detailed description of what the look on his father’s face says 
about his thoughts and feelings (77, emphasis in the original). In the end, the narrator’s 
theory of mind ability is also the reason why he is finally able to forgive his father, as he 
describes how “[i]t is not like I totally believed my father had no memory of it, but more 
like I was admitting, little by little, it was possible he blocked it out” (79-80). Smith 
describes this narrator’s “empathetic imaginative leap” into his father’s head as a rare 
example of a Wallace character escaping his self-centeredness by an act of perspective-
taking. She argues that “[g]enerally, we refuse to be each other. Our own experiences feel 
necessarily more real than other people’s, skewed by our sense of our own absolute 
centrality. But this young man in his simplicity does the difficult thing: he makes a leap 
into otherness” (282). The young man’s ability to experiment with the possibility that his 
father perceives reality in a way different than he does, his ability to apply a “what if” 
mentality and imagine the situation of his father, thus appears to be the key to how he is 
able to forgive his father.  
The focus on perspective persists all the way to the end of this story. When the 
narrator ultimately decides to contact his family after a year of complete and infuriated 
silence, perspective is emphasized again as he describes how “and so, out of (to them) 
nowhere, I call my folks’ house and ask if I can come along for my sister’s birthday” (80). 
These repeated descriptions of the narrator using his theory of mind ability can be seen 
as proof of how this character at least perceives himself as quite skilled at understanding 
the minds of others by considering a perspective not his own. The perpetual focus on 
perspective-taking in the stories depicting characters able to empathize illustrates the idea 
that an ability to consider situations from different perspectives is a prerequisite for using 
one’s theory of mind ability to empathize with others.  
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3.2 Dubious Empathy 
As mentioned in the introduction, even some of the hideous men in the collection’s 
recurring title story appear to be able to use their theory of mind to understand the 
characters around them. The discussions of these characters in analyses of Brief 
Interviews often center on how they manipulate their audience to fulfill their cruel and 
egotistical desires. Holland for one discusses how these men “enact a mask of earnestness 
to work toward cruel, ironic purposes” and underscores their manipulative tactics 
(“Mediated” 117). She also suggests that the structure of the interviews, together with 
Wallace’s assurance that it is the same woman conducting all of them (Stein 90), calls for 
readerly sympathy with this woman (“Mediated” 119). However, there is a possible 
alternative way of regarding these interviews. While I do not wish to suggest that these 
men are not both cruel and manipulative, or that the actual reader is not supposed to 
sympathize with the interviewer, such discussions miss out on something important, 
namely the men’s frequent use of their theory of mind ability to understand the people 
around them. Because if one, as a reader, is able to bracket the (to say the least) morally 
dubious purposes of these men, it soon becomes evident that many of them actually 
possess a rather well-developed capacity for theory of mind. In fact, these men frequently 
step outside of their own perspectives to understand the minds of others. The capacity and 
the perspective-taking is of course most often used as attempts to manipulate the 
interviewer or some other character, and sometimes it might even be fake attempts, but 
the capacity is nevertheless there.  
These men’s well-developed capacities for theory of mind soon stand evident 
when analyzing some of the interviews in “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men”. One 
example of a hideous character using his theory of mind ability is the man in interview 
#40. This particular character, who calls his undeveloped arm “the Asset” and uses it as 
a means to manipulate women into sleeping with him out of pity, gives the interviewer a 
detailed account of how his understanding of these women’s minds gives him a chance 
to seduce them (82). Even more overtly, he is apparently able to understand the thoughts 
of the interviewer, as can be seen when he tells her that he “see[s] how you’re trying to 
be polite and not look at it” (82). It might not require very much of imagining and 
perspective-taking to understand that your company does not want to openly stare at a 
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deformed body part of yours, but on the basic level it is nonetheless a use of the man’s 
capacity for theory of mind. Similarly, the man in interview #48 is using his theory of 
mind ability to read his dates in order to determine whether they will participate in his 
intricate game of tying them up. This particular man is very aware of the importance of 
this kind of mind-reading. As he describes the women’s reactions when he asks if they 
would allow him to tie them up, he mentions how the women “are looking at you because 
they are trying to read you. To size you up, as you have apparently sized them up, as the 
proposal appears to imply” (109). In fact, this whole story can be seen as a detailed 
description of how this man is using his theory of mind ability to determine whether or 
not his proposal will be approved. The man himself calls this process “[c]hicken-sexing”, 
as a reference to how certain people in Australia and New Zealand allegedly are able to 
tell the sex of a chicken just by looking at it (100). This, one could argue, is perhaps not 
a very noble way of using one’s theory of mind ability, but it is nevertheless a fairly 
developed analysis of the possible functions of the ability. As such, it is also an illustration 
of the fact that a well-developed capacity for theory of mind and empathy need not be 
ethically admirable.  
Another similarly abject example of characters in the title story using their theory 
of mind ability to “understand” women can be found in interview #28. In this part of the 
story, what appears to be two grad students are discussing what they perceive as the 
paradox of what “today’s women think they want versus what do they really deep down 
want” from a man (226, emphasis in the original). According to these two men, “today’s 
postfeminist era” has somehow made women confused regarding their sexuality and, 
because of this confusion, “today’s women” are very difficult to seduce and use for the 
sexual purposes these men are interested in (228). This, the men go on, has led to that 
“today’s women” are unprecedentedly hard to understand. One of them describes his 
perception of the situation as: 
a total mess. You can go nuts trying to figure out what tack to take. She might 
go for it, she might not. Today’s woman’s a total crap-shoot. It’s like trying to 
figure out a Zen koan. Where what they want’s concerned, you pretty much have 
to just shut your eyes and leap. (227-28) 
However, his friend appears to be a little more optimistic. He agrees that understanding 
women today “takes some serious deductive fire-power and imagination”, but goes on to 
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argue that “actually most of the time you can figure out what they want, I mean almost 
logically deduce it, if you’re willing to make the effort to understand them and to 
understand the impossible situation they’re in” (228, emphasis in the original). Again, I 
do not wish to go into a discussion regarding the moral repulsiveness of these men’s 
conversation, as that matter appears to be rather clear. What is important for my thesis is 
instead the fact that these men are discussing the possibility of understanding other 
persons’ minds by imagining their situations and the, in this case and as the men see it, 
complicated perspectives of these persons. The man who actually has belief in this kind 
of mind-reading stresses something crucial in this matter: that it takes effort to understand 
someone else’s mind. It is not something that comes naturally, since we, as Smith puts it, 
always are “skewed by our sense of our own absolute centrality” (282). Hence, even 
though the men in these interviews are not using their theory of mind ability with what 
the majority of Brief Interviews’ audience would call admirable purposes in mind, they 
still make use of it. By doing so, they at least attempt to understand a mind other than 
their own. The case of whether or not their understanding correlates with reality, which I 
think it is safe to say that it most often does not, is again of minor importance.  
Another aspect regarding the interviews’ hideous men that risks being 
overlooked if one focus too much on their hideousness is the fact that many of them 
frequently ask for empathy by appealing to some other character’s theory of mind ability. 
In interview #11, which appears to be a conversation between the interviewer and a (soon 
to be former) partner of hers, the man in the story is about to leave the interviewer. While 
doing so, he is also blaming his partner for the fact that he is leaving by claiming that he 
leaves because he cannot stand that she thinks he will leave. What he also does, however, 
is appeal for empathy and for the interviewer to use her theory of mind ability. After the 
man has described how him leaving is not a confirmation of the woman’s fears about him 
leaving but, ironically, because of them, he admits that he understands how the situation 
will appear from her perspective: “It is ironic from your point of view, I can see that. 
Okay. And I can see you totally hate me now” (21, emphasis in the original). This, of 
course, does not make his manipulative and admittedly very selfish behavior any more 
excusable, but it does in fact suggest that he is able to step outside of his own perspective 
and attempt to understand another person’s thoughts and feelings. As the story is about 
to end, the man becomes more and more desperate in his attempts to get his soon ex-
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girlfriend to understand the situation as he sees it. As he is trying to explain, he asks her 
“[c]an you maybe see you just might have been wrong, even possibly? Could you give 
me that much, do you think? … Can you see I might be pretty torn up about it too? Can 
you? That you’re not alone in this?” (22, emphasis in the original). Whether or not the 
woman eventually can see this never becomes clear, since she is always silent in the story. 
More on the issue of the silent interviewer and her influence on the relationship between 
reader and text will be discussed in chapter 4. For now, however, it is important to notice 
the many appeals for empathy by such an unsympathetic character. 
In interview #2, which is similar to interview #11 in several ways, the pattern is 
repeated. In this interview, a man is sitting down with his girlfriend to explain that he is 
afraid he might hurt her feelings because his “relationship record indicates a guy who’s 
bad news” (91). Just as was the case with interview #11, this man appeals for empathy by 
asking his conversation partner to try and view the situation as he views it. After one of 
the story’s omitted questions, he tries to explain how “[i]t’s not as simple as that. At least 
not the way I see it. And believe me my way of seeing it is not that I’m a totally decent 
guy who never does anything wrong” (98). After having revealed that what he is most 
afraid of is that he might not have the capacity to truly love another person, the man asks 
his girlfriend to identify with his pain:  
Can you imagine what it takes to tell you this? That I’m terrified that after I’ve 
told you all this I’m going to feel so guilty and ashamed that I won’t be able even 
to look at you and stand to be around you, knowing that you know all this about 
me and now being constantly afraid of what you’re thinking all the time? (99)  
What the man claims to be afraid of could be described as not being able to turn off his 
theory of mind ability. After asking her to imagine his thoughts and feelings, he is afraid 
that he will never be able to stop imagining her thoughts and feelings. Regardless of 
whether the man is actually honest here or if he, as he himself mentions might be the case 
and as Holland has suggested, “enact[s] a mask of earnestness” to get the woman to end 
the relationship, is not the point (“Mediated” 117). The point is that the man’s alleged 
fear indicates the idea that imagining someone else’s thoughts is not always something 
positive; it is the manner in which the capability to imagine someone else’s thoughts is 
exercised that determines the consequences. The man’s fear can be seen as indicating a 
part of the “terror” Holland refers to when mentioning how the “imagined acts of 
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empathy” in Brief Interviews are greeted “with terror and gratitude” (“Mediated” 127). 
This hint suggests that the ability to understand another’s mind by perspective-taking 
might sometimes have dire consequences for human relationships. In other words, it 
indicates that the capacity to empathize is not an inherently positive capacity.  
 The possibly most disturbing case of an interviewee appealing for empathy by 
perspective-taking is the man in interview #46, who argues for how rape might have 
“positive aspects for a human being in the long run” (117). Holland writes that this “pro-
degradationist rapist … not only verbally accosts us but also elicits our empathy by asking 
us to imagine suffering the same brutality he implies he has suffered himself” 
(“Mediated” 119). While I hesitate to apply the use of “us” in this context, since the 
question of who the addressee of the interviewee is appears to be more complicated than 
the use of an “us” equaling the text’s addressee with the actual reader suggests (a question 
that will be dealt with in chapter 4.4 of this thesis), Holland’s pairing of verbally accosting 
and an eliciting of empathy is significant. This story is completely crammed with “what 
if” scenarios. The interviewee is constantly trying to get the interviewer to change what 
he terms her “knee-jerk” attitude toward severely cruel and degrading acts. He is 
constantly playing with how the identity of the person victimized in the horrible ways he 
describes (the certainly disturbing examples he is using are gang rapes and the Holocaust) 
will affect the interviewer’s reaction with questions like “[w]hat if I told you that my own 
wife got gang-raped? Not so sure of yourself now are you” (120). Later on, the man 
further confuses the narrative situation by adding “[w]hat if I said I wasn’t even married? 
Then what? Then it’s show-time, believe you me baby” (123). When he finally tries with 
“what if I said it happened to me? Would that make a difference?”, and then adds “I’m 
not saying it happened to me or him or my wife or even if it happened but what if it did? 
What if I did it to you? Right here? Raped you with a bottle?”, what is true and what is 
not true in the story world is indeed unclear (124).  
What is clear, however, is the fact that perspective plays an important role here. 
The interviewee is constantly appealing to the interviewer to make use of her theory of 
mind ability by asking her to imagine the different extreme scenarios he is describing, 
and he frequently asks her to apply other perspectives than her default, “knee-jerk”, one. 
When making the controversial claim that a horrendous rape might provide the victim 
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with a possibly enlarged world view, he explains that “[n]obody’s suggesting she was 
liking it while it was happening or that it should have happened. But let’s put two things 
into perspective here. One is, afterwards she knows something about herself she didn’t 
know before” (118). Again, this is of course an abhorrent argument in many ways, but it 
is also an extreme example of a character trying to convince another character to step out 
of her perspective to understand someone else. When it eventually becomes clear to the 
man that the interviewer does not seem to buy his argument, he thinks that the reason for 
this is that she is not able to step outside of her own perspective and empathize with 
someone different from herself. After suggesting that the horrible rape happened to him, 
the man asks: 
Does it have to be a woman? You think, maybe you think you can imagine it 
better if it was a woman because her external props look more like yours so it’s 
easier to see her as a human being that’s being violated so if it was somebody 
with a dick and no tits it wouldn’t be as real to you? (124) 
What becomes clear in a passage like this is that the man regards himself as having a 
rather excellent theory of mind ability. He sees himself as able to guess what the 
interviewer thinks, as well as the reasons behind her thinking this way. Moreover, he 
accuses her of having a poorly developed theory of mind ability, of lacking the ability to 
empathize because she cannot imagine the feelings of a person with a body too different 
from hers. The argument might be clouded by the man’s controversial opinions, but the 
question of with whom we are able, or willing, to empathize is a question central to Brief 
Interviews.  
 
3.3 Problematic Empathy 
Perspective and theory of mind is not only emphasized in the few stories where a character 
actually is able to empathize with others in Brief Interviews. In “The Depressed Person”, 
the main character is constantly ridiculed due to her inability to consider a perspective 
other than her own. Even though she (very) frequently calls the friends in what she terms 
her Support System “for sharing and support and just a few well-chosen words to help 
her get some realistic perspective on the day’s despair and get centered and gather 
together the strength to fight through the emotional agony of the next day”, she is never 
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able to consider a perspective not her own (39). She is constantly stuck in her own mind 
and her own self-conscious perspective on her surroundings, a fact that is ridiculed time 
and again.  
The depressed person’s inability to consider a perspective not her own stands 
evident when scrutinizing her relationship with her therapist. After the therapist has 
committed suicide, the inability becomes painstakingly clear as it is described how 
“[e]ven on top of the shattering abandonment-issues it brought up, the therapist’s 
unexpected death also could not have occurred at a worse time from the perspective of 
the depressed person’s journey toward inner healing” (52). Even after a tragic end to 
someone’s life, the depressed person is apparently unable to step out of her own 
perspective. In a long description of how the depressed person perceives her therapist’s 
habit to covertly look at her watch during their therapy sessions, it is described how this 
behavior “made it appear, from the depressed person’s admittedly hypersensitive 
perspective” as an insult, as if the therapist believed the depressed person to be stupid 
enough not to notice this watch-looking (54n4). This habit, the depressed person feels, 
exposes the fact that the therapist is only professionally interested in her problems. This 
is of course likely to be true, due to the therapist’s profession, but the depressed person 
fails to reconcile with the thought because of her inability to step out of her own 
perspective. Again, it is emphasized how this appears from the depressed person’s 
perspective, as it is described how the therapist’s behavior and gestures “from the 
depressed person’s perspective looked to her more like emotional detachment” (55n4). 
Given that the depressed person is a deeply unhappy and pathetically portrayed character, 
her inability to consider situations from a perspective other than her own underscores the 
dangers of this inability. 
 One part of the depressed person’s problem seems to be that she has a very well-
developed theory of mind ability, comparable to the man in interview #2 discussed in 
chapter 3.2. This problem can be seen in how she dreads that the friends in her Support 
System – a group of friends she admittedly demands much of in terms of both empathy, 
time, and patience – might experience the depressed person as a burden. The narrator 
describes how the depressed person tells her therapist how she “almost always imagined 
she (i.e., the depressed person) could detect, in the friend’s increasingly long silences 
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and/or tedious repetitions of encouraging clichés, the boredom and frustration people 
always feel when someone is clinging to them and being a burden” (42-3). This behavior 
is in fact described as occurring twice already in the depressed person’s school years. 
First, it is described how her “popular and attractive roommate” at a boarding school 
receives a phone call from a boy interested in her and how the roommate gestures to the 
depressed person to knock on the door to give the roommate an excuse to get off the 
phone (43-4). This develops into a traumatic memory for the depressed person, who 
forever after dreads being in the boy’s position. The same pattern is repeated when she, 
in college, overhears a group of male lacrosse players speaking in a very a demeaning 
manner about a young woman they know. Although the depressed person admits “she 
had not had much of a personal relationship or connection to the female student whom 
the men compared to a toilet”, this memory also becomes severely traumatic to her 
because she keeps imagining how it would feel to be the girl so cruelly made fun of (63).   
At first sight, this kind of imagining of other people’s minds would seem like 
proof of a great theory of mind ability. Why, then, is the depressed person portrayed as 
such a pathetic character in such a ridiculing manner? First of all, to regard a well-
developed ability for theory of mind as necessarily positive overlooks the idea that it is 
not the ability per se, but rather the way it is used, that can be measured in terms of “good” 
or “bad”, as discussed in relation to empathy in chapter 2. The problem appears to be that 
the depressed person is using this ability too much and, perhaps more importantly, always 
in a self-centered way. Smith discusses how Wallace frequently underscores the 
importance of awareness, but emphasizes the fact that the awareness has to be directed 
outwards in order to be beneficial (263). She writes that “[i]f Wallace insists on 
awareness, his particular creed is – to use a Wallacerian word – extrorse; awareness must 
move always in an outward direction, away from the self. Self-awareness and self-
investigation are to be treated with suspicion, even horror” (268, emphasis in the original). 
The depressed person’s problem, the reason why her highly-developed theory of mind 
ability is ridiculed instead of celebrated, seems to be that her awareness is everything but 
extrorse. As Holland argues, “one fundamental problem here is the woman’s method of 
dealing with her narcissistic need, not by sincerely engaging herself in others’ present 
lives, but simply by asking them, from the solipsistic safety of a telephone conversation 
or therapy appointment, to fulfill her needs” (“Mediated” 116). This indeed appears to be 
33 
 
true, as becomes clear when regarding how the depressed person’s thoughts always center 
on herself even as she is considering the lives and situations of others. When she imagines 
the traumatic memories discussed above, she is always imagining how she herself would 
feel were she put in their situation. It is described both how “the depressed person dreaded 
more than almost anything ever being in the position of being someone you had to appeal 
silently to someone else in the room to help you contrive an excuse to get off the telephone 
with”, and how she even as an adult is “often preoccupied with the idea that laughing 
groups of people were often derisive and demeaning of her (i.e., the depressed person) 
without her knowledge” (44, 64). Because of her consistent focus on herself, the 
depressed person’s theory of mind ability, albeit well-developed, leads into a spiral of 
deeper self-absorption and depression.  
The depressed person is highly aware of her own self-centeredness, which is 
most clearly seen when her thoughts on her relationship with the therapist are described. 
It is detailed how demeaning the depressed person feels it to be that she has to pay a 
therapist to receive empathy, which she experiences as having:  
to purchase what was in many respects a kind of fantasy-friend who would fulfill 
her childishly narcissistic fantasies of getting her own emotional needs met by 
another without having to reciprocally meet or empathize with or even consider 
the other’s own emotional needs, an other-directed empathy and consideration 
which the depressed person tearfully confessed she sometimes despaired ever 
having it in her to give. (57n5) 
The problem is thus clearly not that the depressed person is ignorant of her own flaws, 
and the story even ends with her asking one of her most empathetic friends “what kind of 
person could seem to feel nothing … for anyone but herself?” (68). Rather, the issue 
appears to be that even when the depressed person expresses awareness about her possible 
inability to empathize with others, she still centers on herself. Even when she appears to 
be imagining another person’s thoughts and feelings, she is in fact only imagining what 
she herself would feel under such circumstances. She is, it seems, caught inside herself, 
and therefore unable to step outside of her own perspective and truly imagine another 
person’s mind. Because the whole story centers on the depressed person’s self-
centeredness, the consequences of this inability become painstakingly visible.  
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A character with similar fears and a similar self-obsession is the character named 
“X” in “Octet”. In the second of the “pop quizzes” that constitutes the story, it is described 
how X is infuriated with his good friend Y because “Y’s done some honorable/upright 
thing that X sees as a disloyal and/or hurtful thing” (132). Again, the importance of 
perspective is emphasized as it is pointed out that the situation might appear very different 
depending on what perspective it is viewed from. Seen from one perspective, whatever Y 
has done can be categorized as honorable, but from X’s perspective, the same act is 
experienced as disloyal. It is never made clear what really happened between X and Y, 
what perspective is the “accurate” one. On the contrary, it is described how “it’s not clear 
whether Y is pathetic and spineless or incredibly strong and compassionate and wise”, 
and that “[m]aybe Y is somehow both pathetic and strong” (133, emphasis in the 
original). This is important, because it underscores how diametrically different the same 
situation can be experienced from two different perspectives and accentuates the 
difficulty of deciding which of a set of multiple perspectives is most accurate. Perhaps 
the point is that neither perspective is more or less accurate than the other. Or, as it was 
put in “Forever Overhead”, that “[t]he lie is that it’s one or the other” (16).  
Furthermore, in the story’s fourth pop quiz, titled “Pop Quiz 6(A)”, it is 
described how X has to actively make Y view a situation from X’s perspective in order 
to get Y to give advice: 
X, by finally resorting to having Y conduct a thought-experiment in which Y 
pretends to be X and ruminates aloud on what he (meaning Y, as X) might do if 
faced with this malignant and horripilative pons asinorum, gets Y finally to aver 
that the best he (i.e., Y as X, and thus by extension X himself) can probably do 
in the situation is simply to passively hang in there[.] (141-42, emphasis in the 
original) 
The emphasis on X’s trouble with getting Y to help him in his situation, and the fact that 
the solution is a thought experiment which helps Y to imagine himself as X and consider 
the troublesome situation from X’s perspective, suggests that perspective-taking often 
demands active effort. At the very least, such frequent discussions of the different 
perspectives available underscore the idea that what perspective one views a situation 
from is always a choice, and that there are most often different perspectives available to 
choose from. Whether or not the actual reader will participate in such exercises of 
perspective-taking, which seems to be something all of these quizzes hinge on, is further 
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developed in the latter part of “Octet” and will be discussed in the fourth chapter of this 
thesis.  
 The problem X asks Y for advice on is the burdensome fact that he is unable to 
empathize with his wife and family in their grieving over the wife’s father, who X highly 
dislikes, dying in cancer. Just as the depressed person, X worries that his self-centeredness 
makes him unable to truly empathize with others. He worries that the fact that he is only 
able to think of himself and his feelings of exclusion in a situation where he should 
empathize with his family “might constitute evidence of some horrific defect in his human 
makeup, some kind of hideous central ice where his heart’s nodes of empathy and basic 
other-directedness ought to be” (138). To reconnect to Smith, X’s awareness and worries 
are everything but extrorse, which is described as the reason for his inability to empathize 
even with the people closest to him. And just as was the case in “The Depressed Person”, 
the fact that X is aware of this inability does not provide a solution to the problem. On 
the contrary, this awareness leads to X being “doubly ashamed and worried about the fact 
that the shame and self-doubt are themselves self-involving and thus further compromise 
his ability to be truly concerned and supportive toward his wife and kids” (138-39). Thus, 
the awareness of the problem cannot provide a solution in itself, since it makes the 
character even more self-centered and less empathetic as this awareness, too, is not 
extrorse but focused on himself.  
 A third character too occupied with herself to be able to empathize with others 
is the wife in “Adult World (I)” and “Adult World (II)”. In fact, this character’s inability 
to consider situations from perspectives other than her own leads to the fact that she is 
not able to understand the true circumstances of the situation she is in. The young wife 
obsessively worries that her and her husband’s sex life is unsatisfactory for the husband 
because her lovemaking technique is “somehow hard on his thingie” (161). The wife’s 
worries take up such a great part of the first story as to almost make it a travesty. As with 
the earlier discussed examples of characters unable to step out of their own perspectives, 
this woman too is aware that this might be the case. The husband’s potential 
dissatisfaction with their sex life, the narrator reports, “could have been nothing but her 
own selfish imagination; the whole problem could be just in her head, she worried” (164). 
Only after the wife has had her so-called epiphany and rapidly matured so that she is 
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suddenly able to realize that the problem lies not in her but within her husband – who she 
eventually understands to be a “Secret Compulsive Masturbator” – is she able to step 
outside of her self-centeredness (184).  
Before this epiphany, it is frequently described how the wife’s perspective is 
both immature and self-centered. The narrator describes how “this wife, being young, 
(and full of herself (she realized only later)), believed it was something about her”, and 
how her understanding of the situation she is in changes when she acquires a different 
perspective on it: “(she realized only later, when she had some mature perspective)” (161, 
162). As is described in the second part of the story (which is structured as an outline of 
a story and is in itself one great exhibition of and play with perspective), it is only after 
her epiphany that the wife is able to see that her “own self-conscious anxieties have kept 
her from having any real idea” about the situation (184). As another example of the 
problems that self-centeredness and an inability to consider situations from different 
perspectives can cause, this story further underscores what can be seen as the collection’s 
argument of the dangers inherent in self-centeredness and a too focused introrse 
awareness. Although the story hardly can be said to end happily as it paints a rather bleak 
portrait of the marriage in question, the wife’s ability to view her situation from a 
perspective that is not self-centered is at least described as a mature capacity that helps 
her to cope with life.   
 
3.4 Different Kinds of Empathy 
Instead of regarding the wife in “Adult World”, X, and the depressed person as characters 
simply incapable of empathizing, it is possible to analyze their problem based on an 
acknowledgement that there might exist different kinds of empathy. In a discussion about 
the difference between compassion and pity in his book What Literature Teaches Us 
about Emotion (2014), Hogan introduces as many as three types. The basic form, Hogan 
claims, is “allocentric empathy”, which involves “imagining some other person’s 
experience as such” (284). Hogan’s two other types are termed “projective empathy”, 
which “involves imagining oneself in the position of the other person”, and “normative 
empathy”, which “involves imagining some normatively standard person in that position” 
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(278). Normative empathy rarely seems to be the case in Brief Interviews, if nothing else 
because the majority of the characters are everything but “normatively standard” 
characters (whatever that may be), and will not be discussed more in this thesis.  
Hogan’s two first categories, however, provide a new way of considering the 
characters’ (in)ability to empathize with others. The problem for the characters unable to 
empathize with others due to an almost pathological self-centeredness could be regarded 
as an inability to experience allocentric empathy. Whenever these characters imagine 
another character’s situation, they do so by imagining themselves in the other character’s 
position: the depressed person feels sad when thinking about her traumatic memories of 
demeaning situations because she fears how she herself would feel in those situations; X 
is unable to empathize with his family in their mournful situation because he cannot step 
out of his own perspective and truly, on an emotional level, imagine the situation as it is 
experienced by them; and the wife in “Adult World” cannot fathom that her problems 
might not be caused by herself because she is far too filled with self-centered anxiety to 
consider the situation as it is experienced by her husband. In other words, these characters 
constantly and perhaps too frequently experience projective empathy while being 
depicted as unable to experience allocentric empathy. These examples can be contrasted 
with, for example, the boy in “Forever Overhead”, who imagines how the woman above 
him on the ladder must feel (and not how he would feel in her situation), and with the 
narrator from “Signifying Nothing”, who repeatedly tries to understand how the situation 
must appear to his father (and not how he would experience the situation, were he in the 
father’s position). The results of an inability to experience allocentric empathy depicted 
in Brief Interviews are, as discussed above, depression and tormenting anxiety. 
The difference between these two contrasting kinds of empathy is in fact 
discussed in two of the stories (albeit not in Hogan’s terms): “Octet” and the last of the 
interviews, #20. In the last pop quiz of “Octet”, the question of how to empathize with 
others in a constructive way is discussed frequently and in detail. This part of the story, 
narrated in the second-person,6 begins with the line “You are, unfortunately, a fiction 
writer” and centers on the conundrum of how to really connect with your readers as a 
                                                          
6 The mode of narration in this second-person narrative will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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writer (145). Its structure as a description of the process of writing the story’s preceding 
quizzes, and the declared desire that this last quiz is supposed to work in order to get the 
reader to reconsider the earlier quizzes so that the story will end up as “a certain sort of 
‘interrogation’ of the person reading them”, leads to an intricate discussion of empathy 
(145, emphasis in the original). In a passage detailing the fiction writer’s convoluted 
problem regarding how to truly know whether the story will work in the way desired, the 
narrator describes that this hinges on in what way the writer empathizes with the reader. 
After having described how “you” try to read the story just written with the eyes of an 
average reader, some “total stranger who’s probably sitting down at the end of a long hard 
day to try to unwind by reading this belletristic ‘Octet’ thing”, the narrator goes on to 
describe how: 
you know that this is a very bad corner to have painted yourself into, as a fiction 
writer. There are right and fruitful ways to try to ‘empathize’ with the reader, but 
having to try to imagine yourself as the reader is not one of them; in fact it’s 
perilously close to the dreaded trap of trying to anticipate whether the reader will 
‘like’ something you’re working on, and both you and the very few other fiction 
writers you’re friends with know that there is no quicker way to tie yourself into 
knots and kill any human urgency in the thing you’re working on than to try to 
calculate ahead of time whether that thing will be ‘liked.’ It’s just lethal. (152-
53, emphasis in the original) 
Since the spelled-out purpose of “Octet” is to communicate an “ambient but univocal 
urgency” through the text, something that kills such an urgency is clearly not positive 
(153). What is described as such a negative and dangerous line of thinking could in other 
words be defined as projective empathy. To “imagine yourself as the reader” would equal 
the writer imagining himself in the position of the reader, i.e. of experiencing projective 
empathy. Such empathizing through imagining is not simply described as bad, or as a 
rather unproductive way of writing fiction; it is “lethal”. Moreover, it is described as 
dangerous because of its egocentric quality. This way of imagining oneself as the reader 
is based on imagining whether or not the reader will like what you have produced. The 
focus is thus not actually on the imagined reader, but rather on how this imagined reader 
perceives “you”; the focus is not other-directed. Even though this particular quote and 
story centers on the specific situation of writing fiction, the argument still holds when 
applied to situations of empathizing outside of the particular episode described. As such, 
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this concrete example reiterates the warning for this kind of empathy presented in Brief 
Interviews.   
One possible solution to this problem of self-centered empathy presented in Brief 
Interviews seems to lie in the characters’ capacity to let go of themselves and their egos. 
In an observation of how Wallace always seems to ask the same question in his work (the 
question being “[h]ow do I recognize that other people are real, as I am?”), Smith claims 
that the answer to this question, also always the same, is that “[y]ou may have to give up 
your attachment to the ‘self’” (291, emphasis in the original). As it so happens, this 
practice of letting go of the self is both referred to and further developed in the last part 
of “Octet”. In a discussion of the, to the narrator, very problematic question of how to 
truly “be with” another person instead of just using that person for selfish needs, it is 
described how this sort of being with someone else requires “some nameless but 
inescapable ‘price’” (155, emphasis in the original). This price, it is described:  
can actually sometimes equal death itself, or at least usually equals your giving 
up something (either a thing or a person or a precious long-held ‘feeling’ or some 
certain idea of yourself and your own virtue/worth/identity) whose loss will feel, 
in a true and urgent way, like a kind of death[.] (156) 
In order to be with somebody else in an unselfish, other-directed way, which I will just 
assume includes empathizing with that particular somebody, it seems that a letting go of 
the self so total that it amounts to dying is necessary. Described this way, this capacity 
does not appear to be a very common one. And indeed, there are very few characters in 
Brief Interviews who seem to possess it. As Smith observes, “[m]ost of Wallace’s people 
refuse, even for a moment, to give up the self” (297). The vast majority of the characters 
inhabiting Brief Interviews seem incapable of giving themselves up due to their self-
centeredness and their inability to step out of their own perspective. As argued above, this 
inability leads to their confinement to projective empathy, a confinement that does not 
have positive results. 
One of the few characters depicted as able to give up herself emerges in the last 
of the collection’s 18 interviews, #20. This interview presents a monologue by a cynical 
young man who describes how his falling in love with a woman he first saw as “a strictly 
one-night objective” changed his whole world-view (288). As the man describes why he 
fell in love with her and how he changed, he also presents an embedded narrative of this 
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young woman and “the unbelievably horrifying accident in which she was brutally 
accosted and held captive and very nearly killed” (287). In this embedded narrative, it 
soon becomes clear that the woman has succeeded with the controversial task of 
empathizing with her rapist. The man describes how this girl is able to “use her 
penetrating focus to attempt to feel and empathize with the sex offender’s psychosis and 
rage and terror and psychic torment” so successfully that she actually manages to “touch 
the beauty and nobility of the generic human soul beneath all the psychosis” (303). This 
extraordinary ability to empathize under extreme circumstances could be interpreted as 
the ultimate version of acknowledging the “queer nameless ambient urgent interhuman 
sameness” that “Octet” asked for (157).  
The woman in interview #20 is allegedly able to feel such interhuman sameness 
with the man raping her during the rape. It is described how she, during the horrible 
episode, found herself “feeling no longer paralyzing terror for herself but a nearly 
heartbreaking sadness for him, the psychotic mulatto”, and how suddenly “she felt terror 
but not her own” (306, 308). She is thus depicted as able to empathize with the most 
hideous of the collection’s men, which is not an easy contest to win considering the fact 
that Wallace’s book is crowded by characters despising their own children and taking 
every advantage there is to be taken of the people around them. The key is, allegedly, her 
ability to let go of herself and focus completely on the situation the brutal rapist is in, i.e. 
her ability to experience allocentric empathy. In the most extreme of situations, this 
woman is thus depicted as able to empathize with someone else in a bona fide extrorse 
and allocentric manner.  
Interview #20 is also, as Boswell observes, “a story about storytelling”, even 
though it deals with the subject in a perhaps more covert way than “Octet” (198). Apart 
from being depicted as the ultimate empathizer, the woman in this storytelling story 
further appears to be the ultimate narrator as she allegedly is able to communicate 
everything that is described in such a roundabout manner in “Octet”. Even more to the 
point, this woman is able to communicate her message of empathy and human 
commonality to a man who belongs to a very cynical audience and, consequently, to 
completely change his view of the world. In “Octet”, it is described how “you” hope that 
the metafictional strategies used in the last pop quiz will make the reader recognize that 
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a dismissal of these strategies as “postclever metaformal hooey … would be based on 
precisely the same sort of shallow formalistic concerns she was (at least at first) inclined 
to accuse the octet of” (151-52). Through the telling of her story, the accosted woman is 
able to produce exactly this kind of revelation in her listener, i.e. the once so cynical man. 
This man describes how her way of telling the story helps him listen to it with “increasing 
attention” and reveals that “the qualities I found myself admiring in her narration of the 
anecdote were some of the qualities about her I’d been contemptuous of when I’d first 
picked her up in the park” (297). The woman’s narration is thus capable of presenting the 
man with a kind of revelation that resonates back through her character and story and 
makes him see both in a different light, just like the narrator in “Octet” hopes his narration 
will work. Moreover, the cynical man’s reconsideration of the woman and her narration 
helps him use his theory of mind ability to, for a moment, put himself in her situation and 
attentively imagine what she has experienced. He describes how the story “helped me 
focus almost entirely on the anecdote itself and thus helped me imagine in an almost 
terrifyingly vividly realistic way just what it must have felt like for her, for anyone” (297, 
emphasis in the original). Given the man’s cynical distance at the outset of the story, 
where he depicts the woman as a “Granola Cruncher” and accuses her of “emotional 
incontinence”, getting him to rethink his default cynicism seems like quite an 
achievement (288). 
One major part of this achievement depends upon the fact that the woman is 
willing to take the risk of appearing sentimental. In his much quoted essay “E Unibus 
Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” published in 1993, Wallace discusses the possible 
directions of contemporary fiction produced in an era pervaded by cynicism. In the essay, 
Wallace tries out different solutions to the problem of a postmodernism that, he thinks, 
has lingered in the culture too long. In the end, he prophesizes that “[t]he next real literary 
‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as some weird bunch of anti-rebels, born oglers 
who dare somehow to back away from ironic watching, who have the childish gall 
actually to endorse and instantiate single-entendre principles” (81, emphasis in the 
original). He then goes on to exemplify how these “new rebels might be artists willing to 
risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of the gifted 
ironists, the ‘Oh how banal.’ To risk accusations of sentimentality, melodrama. Of 
overcredulity. Of softness” (81, emphasis in the original). If disregarding the fact that it 
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is very difficult to accuse her brutal story of being banal,7 the woman in interview #20 
seems to match very well with this description. She is constantly using terms that the man 
retelling her story makes sure that his interlocutor understands are not widely accepted as 
used in an un-ironic way in the story world. He mentions how she used “the, well, the 
quote L-word itself several times without irony or even evident awareness that the word 
has through tactical over-deployment become trite and requires invisible quotes around it 
now at the very least” (292-93). Furthermore, he describes how it is a trait of this type of 
woman to use a “specific blend of childish diction like Hi and fib with flaccid abstractions 
like nurture and energy and serene” (291, emphasis in the original). In other words, the 
woman is a very easy target for any gifted ironist setting out to make fun of her. However, 
due to exactly this sincerity and credulity, she is able to, in the end, make her listener step 
outside of his own cynical perspective and imagine the situation of someone else. As a 
result of being able to experience allocentric empathy in the most extreme of situations, 
and through risking ridicule when retelling her story, this woman emerges as both the 
narrator asked for in “Octet” and the new rebel described in “E Unibus Pluram”.   
As the woman of the story emerges as both an ultimate empathizer and an 
ultimate narrator, it gradually becomes clear that the man retelling her story is neither of 
the two. When he is about to end his retelling of the woman’s story, he tells the 
interviewer that “I’m not putting it right. I can’t make you feel what I felt” (316). As the 
story ends with him getting upset – probably because the interviewer does not respond in 
the way he would have preferred – his failure as a narrator becomes painstakingly clear. 
To understand why the man fails with the mission to communicate the idea of human 
commonality when retelling a story that succeeded in communicating this idea to him, it 
is first of all necessary to notice the fact that he does not appear willing to risk being 
ridiculed. As mentioned, he cannot stomach using the “L-word”, but must insert a “quote” 
before it as a verification showing that he is aware of how ridiculous a sincere use of that 
word might come across. Similarly, when describing the woman’s “altered state of 
attention” during the rape, he details how this state made her realize that even the 
                                                          
7 In his lucid discussion about the connections between interview #20 and “E Unibus Pluram”, Diakoulakis 
does in fact argue that the woman in interview #20 “is the one that has a truly banal, sentimental, 
melodramatic story to tell” (149). While I concur with the claim that the woman tells her story in a manner 
which could be described as banal, sentimental, and melodramatic, I think that an interpretation of the story 
itself as banal overlooks the gruesome facts of the woman’s story. 
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intestines of the cruel rapist “were all made of precisely the same thing and were 
connected by something far deeper and more elemental than what we limitedly call quote 
unquote love” (309). These and the numerous other examples where the man inserts the 
word “quote” or otherwise indicates a cynical distance signal that he is not using specific 
expressions in a sincere and unguarded way. Additionally, the man is constantly trying to 
imagine what the interviewer, his audience of the retold story, thinks as he is narrating. 
In the very beginning of the interview, he explicitly states that “I’m aware of how it might 
sound, believe me” (287). Thus, contrary to the woman, this man is not able to avoid the 
trap of trying to imagine the thoughts of his “reader” in the dangerous way outlined by 
the narrator in “Octet”.  
Furthermore, even when the man affirms that the woman’s story made him 
imagine the situation she experienced, it is always evident that he is still self-centered in 
these acts of imagining. This, as it seems, is largely due to his inability to let go of (the 
idea of) himself and, thus also, his inability to experience allocentric empathy. As he 
details the effect the story had on him, he describes how “I felt more and more sad, hearing 
it, trying to imagine what she’d been able to pull off, and felt more and more sad that on 
our way out of the park I’d felt that tiny stab of disappointment, maybe even anger, 
wishing she’d been more of a challenge” (314). Thus, even when he admittedly tries to 
imagine the gruesome situation depicted, he allegedly cannot help but to relapse into self-
centeredness and ponder what the situation says about him. Holland accuses this man of 
being an “empathy-poser” (“Mediated” 120), which, regarding the frequency of which he 
asks the interviewer questions like “[d]o you see how open I’m being with you here?”, 
appears accurate (313). The man seems so focused on appearing open and honest that it 
becomes practically impossible for him to actually be open and honest. His ultimate self-
centeredness is finally admitted in the end, when he describes how he started to cry as the 
woman told her story and how this made him feel embarrassed, “not for crying, but for 
wanting so badly to know how she took it, whether it made me seem sympathetic or 
selfish” (316). Thus, even as the man asserts that the woman’s narrative has 
fundamentally changed him, it eventually becomes clear that he is still too self-centered 
to truly experience allocentric empathy. He is not capable of imagining the horrible 
anecdote as it was experienced by the woman, because he is not able to let go of his own 
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appearance. This serves as a possible explanation for why this man fails as narrator where 
the woman succeeded, even as they are in fact retelling the very same story.  
 In conclusion, when analyzing the characters in Brief Interviews and their ability 
or inability to empathize, a versatile pallet of the possible consequences of empathy 
emerges. Many of the characters are portrayed as incapable of experiencing allocentric 
empathy – empathizing by imagining a situation as it appears to someone else – because 
of their inability to step outside of their own perspective. Yet, several of the characters do 
appear to be able to empathize with their fellow characters. The key to this ability is 
frequently described as these characters’ capacity to consider a perspective other than 
their own, which allows them to imagine the situation of someone else. However, as the 
results of the characters’ ability for perspective-taking and mind-imagining are far from 
necessarily positive, it soon stands evident that an approach to empathy as inherently 
positive is insufficient for an analysis of Brief Interviews. By presenting a range of 
examples of the less altruistic manners in which empathy can be utilized, the collection 
can be read as a suggestion for the need to broaden the understanding of empathy in order 
to attain a more complete picture of the complex machinery of the concept.  
 
4. Readers and Empathy 
After this selective survey of how empathy is portrayed in Brief Interviews, it is now 
possible to go into an analysis of how the mode of narration might affect the actual, albeit 
hypothetical, reader’s possible experience of narrative empathy. Narrative empathy, to 
rehearse Keen’s definition, is “the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by 
reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of another’s situation or condition” 
(“Narrative Empathy” paragraph 1). It is thus the flesh-and-blood actual reader’s 
possibility to empathize with characters when reading narratives that will be referred to 
when discussing narrative empathy in the following chapter. Whereas the preceding 
textual analysis focused on empathy as portrayed on the diegetic level, the first level 
mentioned in the beginning of chapter 3, the focus of the following pages will be on the 
second level: on the question of what narrative strategies might induce narrative empathy 
in the reading experience. 
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As mentioned, the mode of narration is indubitably an aspect of major 
importance when it comes to how the actual reader perceives a narrative. Consequently, 
it is also an aspect of major importance when it comes to questions regarding whether the 
actual reader experiences narrative empathy or not. There are an abundance of narrative 
strategies connected to how the mode of narration might affect whether the actual reader 
experiences narrative empathy in such a multifaceted work as Brief Interviews: there is 
frequent use of metafictional devices (most notably in “Octet” and “The Depressed 
Person”), there is often great ambiguity as to who is narrating, and several of the stories 
lack resemblance to conventional narrative forms (e.g. “Datum Centurio”, which is 
structured as a lexical entry in a futuristic dictionary, or “Adult World (II)”, which 
presents what appears to be the writer’s technical notes for the narrative situation). 
Furthermore, there is also the intimate result of stories written as conversations or 
interviews where one conversation partner is most often silent. Interesting examples to be 
mentioned are the remarkably titled “On His Deathbed, Holding Your Hand, the 
Acclaimed New Young Off-Broadway Playwright’s Father Begs a Boon” and, of course, 
the collection’s recurring title story (which will be investigated in chapter 4.4). All of 
these narrative aspects, and indeed many more not mentioned, markedly influence the 
way in which the actual reader interprets the stories and, thus, whether or not the actual 
reader experiences narrative empathy.  
One narrative aspect of particular interest in Brief Interviews, since it both affects 
the relationship between reader and text and is strongly connected to the request for active 
reader participation often discussed in the case of Wallace, is the use of second-person 
narration. As narrative theorist Monika Fludernik points out, second-person narration is 
“a technique that ‘sticks out’ and therefore attracts to itself an interest in its very form and 
in its possible significance” (“Second-Person Narrative” 472). The aim of the following 
section is thus to analyze the possible significance of second-person narration in Brief 
Interviews and, more specifically, to investigate how a pronoun of address might 
influence the actual reader’s possibilities to experience narrative empathy. By comparing 
Brief Interviews’ two second-person narratives – “Forever Overhead” and the last part of 
“Octet” – I aim to analyze the way in which second-person narration can be used to call 
for active reader participation. By such an analysis, I will investigate how this mode of 
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narration can appeal for the reader to use her theory of mind ability and, consequently, 
how it can affect the actual reader’s experience of narrative empathy.  
 
4.1 Second-Person Narration  
However, before moving on to the actual analysis, a brief account of the debated concept 
of second-person narration is necessary. I will not provide a historical overview of the 
research history of this subject,8 but rather focus on aspects essential to how second-
person narration might influence the actual reader’s experience of narrative empathy. In 
her article “Second-Person Fiction: Narrative You as Addressee and/or Protagonist”, 
Fludernik defines second-person fiction as “fiction that employs a pronoun of address in 
reference to a fictional protagonist” (217). In her already mentioned second contribution 
to the 1994 Style issue, “Second-Person Narrative as a Test Case for Narratology: The 
Limits of Realism”, Fludernik furthermore addresses the question of how this specific 
mode of narration asks for active reader involvement. Here, Fludernik argues that stories 
told in first- or third-person often allow the reader to enjoy the narrative from a distance, 
whereas “second-person texts (even if only initially) breach this convention of distance, 
seemingly involving the real reader within the textual world” (457). Similarly, Brian 
McHale claims the second-person pronoun to be “par excellence the sign of relation”, 
and continues by arguing that “every reader [of a second-person narrative] is potentially 
you, the addressee of the novelistic discourse” (223, emphasis in the original). Finally, 
Irene Kacandes mentions “the way narrating through a pronoun of address inevitably 
involves the actual reader” (344n2). These comments indicate that second-person 
narration induces active reader involvement – rather than distanced enjoyment – more 
easily than first- and third-person narration. Because of its vocative effect, the use of the 
second-person pronoun appears to invite the reader to feel personally addressed by the 
                                                          
8 For such an overview, see e.g. Fludernik’s comprehensive article “Introduction: Second-Person Narrative 
and Related Issues”, published in a special issue of Style (28.3, 1994) wholly dedicated to the investigation 
of second-person narration. This issue, which was edited by Fludernik herself, is a seminal contribution to 
the field of narrative studies focusing on second-person narration. See also Rolf Reitan’s “Theorizing 
Second-Person Narratives: A Backwater Project?” in Strange Voices in Narrative Fiction (2011). 
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narrator in a second-person narrative, and this invitation might then call for active reader 
participation.  
 Despite the vocative effect, the reader of a second-person narrative is of course 
not likely to completely accept being the one addressed in second-person fiction, or to 
forget that the “you” addressed and described is always and ultimately a fictional entity. 
Nonetheless, as Kacandes argues, “flesh and blood readers often cannot help feeling that 
they themselves are addressed at the same time that they acknowledge the ‘you’ as a 
character in the fiction” (332). It thus seems possible for the actual reader of a second-
person narrative to feel addressed by the second-person pronoun while simultaneously 
recognizing that the “you” ultimately belongs to a fictional character. In the seventh 
chapter of his book Narrative as Rhetoric (1996), James Phelan discusses this intricate 
question and claims that readers’ apparent multitasking capacity is due to the fact that 
they can occupy different audience roles at the same time (137).9 By comparing the 
narratological concept of “the narratee” with rhetorical theory’s “narrative audience”, 
Phelan investigates how the two concepts might complement each other (Narrative 
138).10 Phelan argues that “the ‘you’ address … invites us to project ourselves … into the 
narratee’s subject position”, which makes it possible for the reader to “feel addressed by 
the narrator but not fully coincident with the narratee” (Narrative 151). This line of 
arguing will prove crucial for Brief Interviews, since many of the stories in the collection 
depend on the reader to step into the narratee’s subject position and imagine herself as 
the “you” in order to induce narrative empathy.  
One important aspect to address when discussing whether or not the actual reader 
will recognize herself as the possible addressee of the second-person pronoun in a second-
person narrative is the fact that there are different kinds of second-person narratives. In 
his book Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction 
(2006), Brian Richardson addresses this issue in a comprehensive manner. According to 
                                                          
9 An earlier version of this chapter was published as an article in Fludernik’s above mentioned 1994 special 
issue of Style, then with the title “Self-Help for Narratee and Narrative Audience: How ‘I’—and ‘You’?—
Read ‘How’”. 
10 The term “narratee” was influentially defined by Gerald Prince as “someone whom the narrator 
addresses” in his “Introduction to the Study of the Narratee” published in 1973 (7). Phelan’s use of 
“narrative audience” is based on Peter J. Rabinowitz’ discussion and categorization of the term in “Truth 
in Fiction: A Reexamination of Audiences” (1977), where Rabinowitz distinguishes four different narrative 
audiences between which the actual reader can move when reading a narrative (126-34). 
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Richardson, there are three main types of second-person narration. The first type is what 
he terms “the standard form”, where “a story is told, usually in the present tense, about a 
single protagonist who is referred to in the second person” (Unnatural 19-20). This type, 
as Richardson has it, is both the most common and the type “closest to more traditional 
forms of narration” (Unnatural 19-20). However, even though this kind of second-person 
narration resembles more traditional first- and third-person narratives in that narrator and 
narratee clearly differ from the actual reader, it still has the potential to disturb and blur 
such traditionally upheld boundaries. As Richardson argues, even this use of the second-
person pronoun “threatens the ontological stability of the fictional world insofar as it 
seems it could be addressing the reader as well as the central character” (Unnatural 20). 
Thus, it is clear that even less conspicuous kinds of second-person narration possibly can 
create a sense of personal address for the actual reader.  
Richardson’s second type is termed “the hypothetical form”,11 which he 
describes as generally distinguished by “the consistent use of the imperative, the frequent 
employment of the future tense, and the unambiguous distinction between the narrator 
and the narratee” (Unnatural 29). This type of second-person narration leads to more 
disturbance of fictional boundaries than the standard form because, as Richardson writes, 
“[t]he ‘you’ is one that can embrace almost all of us” (Unnatural 30). The third of 
Richardson’s types is termed “the autotelic” and is distinguished by its “direct address to 
a ‘you’ that is at times the actual reader of the text and whose story is juxtaposed to and 
can merge with the characters of the fiction” (Unnatural 30). Richardson further adds that 
this type is a “narrativization of a form of address” which occurs only in very short texts 
(Unnatural 30). Due to its capability to merge the fictional narratee with the actual reader, 
this type of second-person narration could be regarded as the one which breaks down 
fictional boundaries most conspicuously. In this type, as well as in the hypothetical form, 
the narrator and narratee are necessarily distinct. All of these types will shed light on the 
difference between Brief Interviews’ two second-person narratives, and the 
acknowledging of how a pronoun used in a piece of fiction can appear to reach out to the 
actual reader will be of particular importance.  
                                                          
11 In his 1991 article “The Poetics and Politics of Second Person Narrative”, Richardson calls this type “the 
subjunctive” (319). 
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However, as will be argued below, even though the second-person pronoun can 
appear to address the reader of a second-person narrative, this effect is not something that 
necessarily occurs in Wallace’s collection. The use of second-person narration in these 
stories appears to be much more complex than to provide automatic reader address. Keen 
illustrates this complexity rather comprehensively in her question about whether the 
“you” of second-person narration “enhance[s] the intimacy of the reading experience by 
drawing the reader and narrator close”, or if the second-person pronoun “emphasize[s] 
dissonance as it becomes clear that ‘you’ can’t include the reader?” (Empathy 98). 
Furthermore, the mere fact that the actual reader feels addressed by the second-person 
pronoun must indeed not necessarily induce narrative empathy. However, if a reader feels 
addressed by the second-person pronoun, she will also identify herself with this pronoun, 
i.e. she will identify herself with the fictional character to whom the second-person 
pronoun technically belongs. Since character identification is a phenomenon capable of 
inducing narrative empathy, as discussed in chapter 2, it is at least possible that 
identification with the second-person pronoun will invite the actual reader to empathize 
with fictional characters.  
If the reader feels addressed by the second-person pronoun, an overlap of 
reference between the fictional character and the actual reader is created. Again, such an 
overlap must not necessarily lead to the actual reader experiencing narrative empathy, 
but, I argue, it will invite the actual reader to make use of her theory of mind ability. What 
I will investigate in the following pages is therefore when it is possible, and perhaps even 
likely, that the reader perceives herself as the potential addressee of Brief Interviews’ 
second-person narratives, and when this scenario appears unlikely. I will perform this 
analysis by first comparing the narrative situation of the two narratives. This comparison 
will be followed by an analysis of how the narratees in the stories are characterized and 
an investigation of the use of imperatives in Brief Interviews’ two second-person 
narratives.  
Beginning with “Forever Overhead”, Boswell speaks about this story’s “reader-
involving second-person point of view” (202), and Holland argues that the second-person 
point of view “extends the intimacy of [the protagonist’s] inner experience to the reader 
who inevitably becomes the owner of that second-person ‘you’” (“Mediated” 113). Even 
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though the vocative aspect of the second-person pronoun and what Fludernik calls “the 
latent generic meaning of you” make it more difficult for the actual reader to distance 
herself from the character designated by this pronoun, a claim that every reader of 
“Forever Overhead” inevitably becomes the owner of the second-person pronoun neglects 
to consider that different types of second-person narratives function in different ways 
(“Second-Person Narrative” 461, emphasis in the original). If every reader would become 
the owner of “you” in “Forever Overhead”, every reader would accept herself as the 
addressee of that pronoun. This, as I will now proceed to argue, does not appear to be the 
case.  
The first reason for why such recognition on part of the reader is not inevitable 
stands evident when comparing the communicative situation of “Forever Overhead” with 
that of the last part of “Octet” by using Richardson’s terminology. Since the narrator and 
the narratee in “Forever Overhead” seem to correlate, this narrative appears to fall into 
the category of the standard form. As described in chapter 3.1, the narrator in this story 
describes the narratee’s inner thoughts and feelings throughout the narrative. The story 
can thus be read as an instance of a narrator addressing himself with the second-person 
pronoun: as a narrator, and protagonist, seemingly speaking to himself. The 
communicative situation in the last part of “Octet” is of a completely different kind. Here, 
the narrator and the narratee are necessarily separate as the narrator frequently gives 
imperatives to the narratee, which would place the story within Richardson’s hypothetical 
form. Imperatives are in fact used in “Forever Overhead” as well, but as I will argue in 
chapter 4.3, they are of a different kind than the ones used in “Octet” and therefore have 
different effects. Furthermore, since, as I will soon go on to exemplify, the second-person 
pronoun of “Octet” also sometimes appears to address the actual reader, this narrative 
could be categorized as belonging to the autotelic form, which Richardson argues is the 
form with “the greatest share of direct address to the actual reader” (Unnatural 32-3). 
After having noted only these brief details, it becomes evident that it is necessary to 
recognize the differences between the types of second-person narration in Wallace’s 
collection in order to fully understand the function and possible vocative effect of the 
second-person pronoun in these stories.     
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4.2 Characterization of the Second-Person Pronoun 
Another crucial aspect influencing the chances for the actual reader to feel addressed by 
the second-person pronoun in a second-person narrative is the degree of characterization 
of the narratee. Phelan argues that “the greater the characterization of the you, the more 
like a standard protagonist the you becomes, and, consequently, the more actual readers 
can employ their standard strategies for reading narrative” (Narrative 137). A precise 
characterization of the “you” would thus obstruct the actual reader from feeling addressed 
by the second-person pronoun, as such a characterization would allow the reader to think 
of “you” as she thinks of a “standard” protagonist in fiction, i.e. not as referring to herself. 
For the actual reader to feel addressed by the second-person pronoun, she would have to, 
to a certain degree, be able to identify herself with “you”, a scenario for which the 
possibility decreases the more specifically the second-person pronoun is characterized. 
Put simply, if the narratee is elaborately characterized, the possibility for the reader to 
feel addressed by the second-person pronoun is slight, since precise characterization 
necessarily elucidates the difference between actual reader and narratee.  
In “Forever Overhead”, the narratee is precisely characterized already from the 
very first sentence. As the story begins with “Happy Birthday. Your thirteenth is 
important”, it instantly becomes difficult for any actual reader reading the story on a day 
which is not her thirteenth birthday – a coincidence for which the odds must be considered 
rather slim – to feel addressed by the narrator (5). The second-person pronoun then 
becomes even more precisely characterized as the story continues and the narratee’s life 
situation is further detailed. For one, the description of the physiological changes 
adjoining the thirteenth birthday reveals the narratee’s male sex already in the story’s 
second paragraph. It also becomes clear that the narratee’s family consists of (at least) a 
father, a mother, and a little sister; that “you” are spending your thirteenth birthday at a 
public swimming pool in Arizona; and that “you” have decided that your thirteenth 
birthday will be the day to jump from the high board at this public pool. In other words, 
“you” are in many ways characterized just as a character in a first- or third-person 
narrative would be characterized, with the exception that the character is called “you”, 
and not “he” or “I”. This could be considered a further argument for why “Forever 
Overhead” belongs to the standard form of second-person narratives, since, as Richardson 
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puts it, this type “oscillates between third and first person perspectives” (Unnatural 32). 
Despite the initial breaching of distance caused by the use of second-person narration, it 
thus appears rather unlikely that an actual reader of “Forever Overhead” would feel 
addressed by the second-person pronoun. The many differences (if not in character, so at 
least in situation, as I think it is safe to say that very few actual readers of this story are 
simultaneously climbing up a high board as they are reading) are underscored time and 
again by the precise characterization of “you”. Thus, it is the differences rather than the 
similarities between actual reader and narratee that are emphasized throughout “Forever 
Overhead”. As a result, together with the communicative situation discussed above, it 
does appear unlikely that every reader of this short story inevitably recognizes herself as 
the addressee of this second-person pronoun.  
The narratee in “Octet” is characterized in an altogether different way. At first, 
however, the characterization of “you” in the last pop quiz of this story does not seem to 
invite the reader to feel addressed by the second-person pronoun either. As mentioned in 
chapter 3.4, the first sentence of the quiz goes “You are, unfortunately, a fiction writer”; 
an opening sentence that certainly does not leave much leeway for any real reader who is 
not a fiction writer to identify with the narratee. The first paragraph then continues to 
describe the very specific piece of fiction that “you” are working on at the moment. This 
is accompanied by a detailed description of the trouble “you” have in succeeding with the 
outlined, also very specific, ambition to make the piece that the narratee is allegedly 
writing work as “a certain sort of ‘interrogation’ of the person reading them” (145, 
emphasis in the original). As the narrator goes on to describe the writing process of these 
stories, it is initially difficult for anyone not a fiction writer who has dealt with the 
described conundrum to feel addressed by the second-person pronoun. It thus appears 
about as likely that an actual reader would use her “standard strategies” when interpreting 
the narrative, to use Phelan’s terms, as was the case in “Forever Overhead” (Narrative 
137). Therefore, it appears rather unlikely that the actual reader of “Octet’s” last quiz will 
feel addressed by the “you” in the beginning of this story.  
However, as the story evolves, the characterization of “you” in “Octet’s” last 
part gradually changes and becomes more generalized. The usual proceeding in second-
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person narration is that the narratee begins as rather uncharacterized, and then gradually 
becomes more precisely characterized as the story proceeds. Fludernik describes how:  
many second-person texts start out with a passage of what initially appears to be 
a generalized … ‘you’, a ‘you’ with which the reader in the role of ‘(any)one’ 
can identify, but the text then proceeds to conjure up a very specific ‘you’ with 
a specific sex, job, husband or wife, address, interests, and so on, so that the 
reader has to realize that the ‘you’ must be an other, a or the protagonist. 
(“Second-Person Narrative” 452) 
Such a gradual change of the characterization of “you” makes the reader reinterpret the 
story as she gradually understands the second-person pronoun to be less generalized, and 
then eventually regards the “you” as addressed to the story’s protagonist. In the last part 
of “Octet”, however, the procedure works the other way around: the story begins with a 
passage describing an indeed very specific “you”, but the reference of this pronoun 
gradually widens as the story unfolds. This widening stands evident when the narrator 
uses analogies to describe the agonies accompanying the narratee’s writing process. The 
first analogy appears when the narrator describes the danger of trying to imagine whether 
a reader will like the fiction “you” are working on by giving a detailed analogy of going 
to a party. The basic principle of the analogy is that you go to a party where you know 
very few people, and then, on your way home, you realize that you have no idea whether 
you liked any of the guests at the party because you were so occupied by the thought of 
whether or not they liked you. After outlining this analogy, the narrator states that 
“[a]nybody who’s had that sort of experience knows what a totally lethal kind of attitude 
this is to bring to a party” (153). Since it is not unlikely that there is a higher number of 
actual readers able to identify with being self-conscious at a party than with being a fiction 
writer who has just written a very specific short story, the result of this analogy is that the 
second-person pronoun becomes more generally applicable.  
The second analogy is to be found in a note a couple of pages later. This time, 
the narrator makes use of an analogy to describe the consequences that might occur if 
“you” have courage enough to ask the reader the delicate question of “whether she feels 
it too, this queer nameless ambient urgent interhuman sameness” (157). This analogy 
presents a detailed description of a scenario where “you” have: 
just bought a fancy expensive take-out dinner from a restaurant and brought it 
home and were just sitting down to try to enjoy it when the phone rings and it’s 
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the chef or restaurateur or whoever you just bought the food from now calling 
and bothering you in the middle of trying to eat the dinner to ask how the dinner 
is and whether you’re enjoying it and whether or not it ‘works’ as a dinner. 
(157n15) 
These analogies create a widening of the “you” which leads to there being a greater 
possibility for the actual reader to perceive herself as the addressee of the narrator, since 
the second-person pronoun is now more generally applicable than it was in the outset of 
the story. The common procedure of second-person narration is thus reversed, and instead 
of gradually characterizing the second-person pronoun more precisely, the “you” of 
“Octet” gradually becomes more generally applicable. As a result, the reader is invited to 
reinterpret the story and the address of “you” as she gradually comes to understand that 
the vocative aspect of the second-person pronoun might call for her own identification 
with the story’s narratee. As will be seen in the following analysis, the interpretation of 
this particular story, and thus also whether or not the actual reader recognizes herself as 
the possible addressee of the second-person pronoun, will have important consequences 
for other stories in the collection as well.  
 
4.3 The Use of Imperatives in the Second-Person Narratives 
Another aspect influencing the possibility for the actual reader to feel addressed by the 
fiction’s second-person pronoun is the use of imperatives, which as mentioned is to be 
found in both of Brief Interviews’ second-person narratives. As discussed in chapter 4.1, 
frequent use of imperatives is a distinguishing trait of Richardson’s hypothetical form. In 
“Forever Overhead”, the imperatives most often describe the actions of the narratee in the 
story world. To mention only a few examples, the narrator tells the narratee to “[c]ock 
your head to the side and hop” (7); “Forget your towel” (8); “Look around. Look bored” 
(9); and to “[s]tep into the skin and disappear” (16). The imperatives in this story are 
almost all descriptions of the narratee’s physical actions and could practically be 
compared to stage directions given to an actor. They could also, quite easily, be read as a 
character’s description of the actions he intends to perform. Because of their physical 
quality and the inevitable difference between the situation of the narratee and the situation 
of the actual reader, it is highly unlikely (and many times impossible) for the actual reader 
to do the bidding of the narrator in this story. The actual reader of “Forever Overhead” 
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cannot climb the high board and “[s]tep into the skin and disappear” as the protagonist of 
the story does, because the actual reader is not part of the story world. Because of this 
inevitable discrepancy between actual reader and narratee, the imperatives of this short 
story can hardly be said to function as invitations to the actual reader to perform the 
actions called for by the narrator. It is of course possible, and indeed common, for actual 
readers to empathize with a character both without feeling addressed by the pronoun used 
to refer to the character in question and without necessarily obeying imperatives given by 
the narrator. As mentioned above, however, a narrative in which the actual reader feels 
addressed by the second-person pronoun tends to blur boundaries and allows for a higher 
degree of character identification than narratives that do not blur these boundaries. Thus, 
even though it is indeed possible that the actual reader will empathize with the narratee 
in “Forever Overhead”, the mere use of second-person narration is not likely to increase 
this possibility in any lasting manner.   
The imperatives used in pop quiz 9 of “Octet” are of a completely different 
nature. Even though the actual reader, of course, is not part of the story world here either, 
the imperatives used in this story are often created in such a way as to be able to get 
carried out by the actual reader as well as the fictional narratee. The majority of 
imperatives in this part of the story are instances of the narrator asking the narratee to 
imagine scenarios or consider certain aspects of fiction writing. To put it another way: 
the majority of imperatives in the last part of “Octet” have to do with the narrator asking 
“you” to make use of your theory of mind ability. To take only the earlier analogies of 
going to a party and ordering a take-out dinner as examples, the narrator tells “you” to 
imagine these scenarios in a very detailed manner several times in these passages. The 
narratee is asked to “consider what [the reader] might think of you just for asking 
something like this” (157-58); to “[t]ake a moment to imagine the faces of the people at 
a party where you did this” (158-59); to, more specifically, “[i]magine the faces’ 
expression fully, in 3D and vibrant color, and then imagine the expression directed at 
you” (159); and to “keep in mind that it may be for nothing” (159). Contrary to the 
imperatives used in “Forever Overhead” the imperatives in the last part of “Octet” can 
thus, theoretically, be carried out by the actual reader. While it is not possible for the 
actual reader of “Forever Overhead” to “[s]tep into the skin and disappear” up on the high 
board, it is in fact possible for the actual reader of “Octet” to imagine and consider the 
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scenarios described in the story. Such reader participation depends on whether or not the 
actual reader chooses to participate in the thought experiment laid out, on her willingness 
to imagine herself in the narratee’s subject position and accept herself as the possible 
addressee of the second-person pronoun. If the actual reader accepts herself as the 
possible addressee of the second-person pronoun and imagines herself in the narratee’s 
subject position, she steps “into a character’s shoes” to connect to Keen’s discussion of 
narrative empathy (Empathy 18). The use of the second-person pronoun in the last part of 
“Octet” thus calls for active participation by an actual reader who has the choice to join 
the game of perspective-taking straightforwardly asked for by the narrator.  
In fact, the reader’s willingness to step into the shoes of “you” is a prerequisite 
for “Octet” to work in the way the narrator describes that the story is intended to work. 
As the narrator mentions time and again, albeit with slightly different phrasings, “Octet” 
is supposed to “address (or ‘interrogate’) the reader directly”, so that the reader is then 
able to recognize “this queer nameless ambient urgent interhuman sameness” the narrator 
so desperately tries to communicate (147n2, 157).  In his article “Why You Can’t Speak: 
Second-Person Narration, Voice, and a New Model for Understanding Narrative”, Matt 
DelConte writes about the “implied universality of experience that we encounter in how-
to narration” (215). As it so happens, universality of experience appears to be exactly 
what the reader is asked to acknowledge in “Octet” through the recurring emphasis on 
“this queer nameless ambient urgent interhuman sameness”. For “Octet” to be successful 
as a narrative in the way the narrator allegedly intends, the actual reader has to make an 
effort to recognize the similarities between herself and the “you” of the story. If doing so, 
she is also invited to recognize this “universality of experience”, this human 
commonality, as she recognizes underlying similarities between herself and a fictional 
character. This universality of experience is underscored by the use of this particular type 
of second-person narration, by the use of “how-to narration”, as this specific mode of 
narration provides the reader with the possibility to acknowledge that she and the narratee 
of the story might be very similar.  
There are, however, other narrative aspects of “Octet” that call for such reader 
participation as well. Goerlandt argues that the many and long footnotes in the story is 
one such aspect. These footnotes, Goerlandt claims, create a “hyper-reflexive jungle” 
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where the meaning depends on “the reader’s willingness to show or refuse sympathy 
and/or empathy” (167). According to Goerlandt, one of the options the reader has in this 
case is to “accept the text’s long-winded direction of the narrator-narratee relation as 
being ‘sincere,’ as truly direct communication between author and reader” (167). This 
option would lead the reader to accept herself as the possible addressee of the second-
person pronoun and imagine herself in the shoes of the narrator/writer, since that is a 
prerequisite for the type of communication asked for in the text to function. If the reader 
accepts herself as the potential addressee of the narrator, and thus imagines herself as the 
writer of the earlier pop quizzes, she is more likely to accept the narrator’s imperative and 
imagine the scenarios portrayed in the narrative. If the actual reader chooses this option, 
if she plays along in the game of perspective-taking into which she is invited, the chances 
that she will recognize the “queer nameless ambient urgent interhuman sameness” of 
“Octet” increase dramatically.  
It is, of course, by all means possible that the actual reader of “Octet” will refuse 
to step into the narratee’s subject position in “Octet”. To determine whether or not actual 
readers accept themselves as the possible addressee of “Octet’s” second-person pronoun 
would require collection of empirical data on individual readers’ reading experiences, 
which lies outside the scope of this thesis. The crucial part, however, is that it is possible 
for the reader to do so, and that calls for such identification can be found in the text. Smith 
mentions how a reader looking for “the consolation of ‘character’” in Wallace always 
will be disappointed, since Wallace’s “stories simply don’t investigate character, they 
don’t intend to. Instead they’re turned outwards, towards us. It’s our character that’s being 
investigated” (276, emphasis in the original). In this particular case, Smith appears to be 
the ideal reader of “Octet’s” narrator, accepting that it is the actual reader’s character that 
is investigated through (among other things) the use of second-person narration. Later in 
her essay, Smith argues that how you react to “Octet” “will make or break you as a reader 
of Wallace” (290). The reason for this, Smith claims, is that what Wallace is “really 
asking” for in “Octet” is:  
for you to have faith in something he cannot possibly ever finally determine in 
language: ‘the agenda of the consciousness behind the text’. His urgency, his 
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sincerity, his apparent desperation to ‘connect’ with his readers in a genuine way 
– these are things you either believe in or don’t. (290)12  
Even though initial beliefs and attitudes regarding fiction might play a significant role in 
the interpretation of any narrative, I would like to propose that it is in fact possible for the 
text to at least suggest how the reader of “Octet” is asked to interpret the story. The 
narrative mode of the story, i.e. the use of second-person narration, is one such language 
means that can suggest the kind of interpretation asked for.  
However, even though there might exist cues in the text for how the reader is 
suggested, or asked, to interpret “Octet”, the actual choice of how to interpret the narrative 
always and necessarily has to be made by the actual reader herself. As was mentioned in 
chapter 1.1, Timmer acknowledges the crucial importance of the reader when she 
observes that “[w]hether or not [“Octet”] works, whether or not the ‘communicative 
urgency’ is transferred at all, depends very much on the reader here. It is the reader who 
is called upon” (113, emphasis in the original). Timmer, Smith, and Goerlandt, it seems, 
have accepted the possibility that they themselves are addressees of the second-person 
pronoun in the last part of “Octet”, since they all describe how the narrator appears to 
reach outside the boundaries of fiction to communicate with them, the actual readers. If 
the actual reader chooses to answer the call made by “Octet”, if she chooses to imagine 
herself as “you” like the three readers mentioned have appeared to, a relationship is 
created between narrator and real, flesh-and-blood reader. This relationship might 
necessarily be a fictional one, but it is nevertheless a relationship created and determined 
by language. Whether or not such a relationship is created is, again, ultimately dependent 
on the actual flesh-and-blood reader, as she must be the one actively choosing to step into 
the shoes of “you”. To experience narrative empathy can thus be regarded as something 
that has to be actively chosen by the actual reader. It is the actual reader who has to choose 
in what way to interpret the narrative strategies of the story and, thus, whether she makes 
use of her capability for empathy and theory of mind to experience narrative empathy. 
                                                          
12 The theoretically intricate question regarding whether it is even apt to speculate upon what Wallace, the 
real author (rather than more abstract terms such as “implied author” or perhaps even “narrator”), is asking 
for will not be dealt with here. It is, however, interesting to note that the question becomes even more 
intricate since Smith is using a quote from an interview with the author himself, where Wallace explains 
how he thinks that “the distinction between good art and so-so art lies somewhere in the art’s heart’s 
purpose, the agenda of the consciousness behind the text”, to interpret his fictional story (McCaffery 50). 
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Read this way, the last sentence of “Octet” – “So decide” – can be understood as the 
ultimate imperative of the story, an imperative of which the reaction will determine the 
actual reader’s interpretation of not only this particular short story, but the whole 
collection (160).  
 
4.4 The Use of Imperatives in the Interviews 
Another use of the second-person pronoun with crucial consequences for the actual 
reader’s possibility to experience narrative empathy in Brief Interviews is to be found in 
the stories directing imperatives to an intradiegetic narratee. The most notable examples 
here are, arguably, present in the collection’s eponymous collection of interviews. The 
characters in the recurring “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men” consist of a rather 
diverse cluster of men, but they all have one thing in common: they are – in different 
ways and degrees – hideous. These men are represented through narratives structured as 
interviews, with the conspicuous feature that the questions asked are absent. The text 
itself provides minimal background information as to why the interviews have been 
conducted, what the nature of the relationship is between interviewer and interviewee, 
and even who the interviewer actually is.13 Due to the omitted questions and the 
interviewer’s almost complete silence, a vacant space is created in the narrative. The 
hideous men address this alleged interviewer, the story’s “you”, with questions, requests, 
and imperatives more than often. Since the answers are never told, the reader has to 
deduce both the original question asked and the interviewer’s reaction to the men’s 
requests. The actual reader has to, in a way, fill the vacant space created by the silent 
interviewer. In order for the narrative to make sense, the actual reader has to step into the 
role of this fictional interviewer and attempt to view the situation from her point of view, 
so that she is able to deduce the questions asked and create a (somewhat) coherent 
narrative out of the fragmentary text. In other words, the actual reader has to experience 
projective empathy as she imagines herself as the interviewer. Boswell mentions how the 
structure of the interviews “puts the reader ‘inside’ the story as a character, making her a 
                                                          
13 As mentioned in chapter 3.2, Wallace himself has revealed that it (according to him) is the same woman 
conducting all of the interviews, and that he views this woman as “the book’s protagonist” (Stein 90). 
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participant in the narrative’s construction”, and argues that the story constructs a kind of 
“’game’… in which the reader must play a role” (188). Here I would add that the actual 
reader must not only play a role in this game, but that she must play an active role. The 
reader’s role and the question of co-creation becomes particularly interesting when the 
interviewed men address imperatives to this silent interviewer and appeal for her to use 
her theory of mind ability in order to understand their thoughts, beliefs, desires, and 
arguments. What I will investigate in these final pages of the thesis is therefore if these 
imperatives can function as addresses to the actual reader, similar to the imperatives of 
“Octet” discussed in chapter 4.3. 
However, before such an analysis is possible, some technical aspects of these 
interviews have to be addressed. First of all, even though this story makes frequent use of 
the second-person pronoun when the men address the silent interviewer, it is not, strictly 
speaking, a second-person narrative. Richardson has defined the category of narrative 
which “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men” seems to belong to in his categorization of 
the variety of fiction using the second-person pronoun. He writes that “[a]nother kind of 
narrative that frequently employs the word ‘you’ but that is not properly speaking a 
second person narrative is the monologue addressed to a real or imaginary homodiegetic 
audience” (Unnatural 18). The second-person pronoun in this category of narrative is 
thus addressed to a fictional character who, in this case, is the interviewer. However, since 
this interviewer is silent in Wallace’s narrative, there are certain similarities between the 
“pure” second-person narratives discussed in chapter 4.3 and “Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men”. As I will soon go on to exemplify, the interviews’ structure with a silent 
character being addressed in the narrative, allows for the imperatives used by the men to 
be interpreted as potentially addressed to the actual reader. It allows for the fiction to, in 
a way, widen the reference of the pronoun across fictional boundaries. Moreover, as was 
the case with particularly “Octet”, the success of these narratives’ requests for empathy 
ultimately depends on whether the actual reader will feel addressed by the men’s use of 
the second-person pronoun and the imperatives used. The boundaries that became blurred 
in the second-person narratives thus have a tendency to become blurred in “Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men” as well.  
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 The second aspect in need of address is the intricate question of who, in effect, 
is doing the narrating in these interviews and, consequently, whom the role of the narratee 
actually belongs to. One way of reading the narrative is by accepting the idea expressed 
by Wallace that all interviews are conducted by the same woman. If accepting this view, 
it would, in the logic of the story world, seem reasonable to categorize this female 
interviewer as narrator. This construction would then make the interviewees, i.e. the 
hideous men, narratees. However, since the interviewer, as mentioned, most often is 
completely silent,14 and since it accordingly is the men who are doing the actual telling 
and, one could argue, narrating, things get somewhat complicated. One possible solution 
to the problematic issue of what terms to use when referring to the characters and their 
roles in “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men”, and the one that I will apply, is to view the 
stories the men present as embedded narratives. If applying this view, the men are the 
narrators in the embedded narratives of a frame story where the female interviewer is the 
narrator. The level I will focus on, then, is the embedded level where the interviewed men 
can be regarded as narrators addressing their interviewer, who then can be regarded as 
the intradiegetic narratee of the men’s narratives. 
 The first interview of particular interest is the earlier discussed interview #46, 
where the interviewed man argues for that brutal rape might have positive consequences 
for the victim “in the long run” (117). As mentioned in chapter 3.2, Holland appears to 
automatically equal the actual reader with the interviewee’s addressee in her discussion 
about this interview. Holland writes that the man in this interview “not only verbally 
accosts us but also elicits our empathy by asking us to imagine suffering the same brutality 
he implies he has suffered himself” (“Mediated” 119). Her use of the pronoun “us” 
indicates that Holland feels personally accosted by this character, that she, perhaps too 
hastily, reads the imperatives used by the man in the interview as automatically directed 
to the actual reader. However, it might not be that simple. While it is certainly possible 
that the actual reader will feel addressed, and then most likely verbally accosted, by the 
man in this interview, such an interpretation is not something that happens automatically 
                                                          
14 There are a few exceptions to the interviewer’s silence. In Interview #48, the interviewer repeatedly 
inserts phrases such as “{flexion of upraised fingers to signify tone quotes}”, and later categorizes these 
finger flexions as “increasingly annoying” (100, 108). However, the majority of the interviews (including 
the ones that I will analyze) represent the interviewer’s voice only with a “Q.” indicating that a question is 
being asked.  
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or necessarily. Rather, such an interpretation is highly dependent on an active and 
effortful choice made by the actual reader. Furthermore, this is a choice with several 
consequences, as the imperatives used by the man in interview #46 are of a particularly 
demanding kind. When speaking about Victor Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning, 
which portrays Frankl’s truly horrible experiences in a concentration camp during World 
War II, the interviewee demands his narratee to “think about it, if there wasn’t a Holocaust 
there wouldn’t be a Man’s Search for Meaning” (116, emphasis in the original). Only a 
page later, the man presents another exceedingly demanding imperative, as he asks his 
narratee to “think about getting gang-raped and degraded and beaten down to within an 
inch of your life” (117-18). These two imperatives are telling examples of when the 
narratee is asked to imagine extremely horrid situations in Brief Interviews. That the 
reader will take the role of the narratee and do the bidding of the narrator in this case, i.e. 
imagine these scenarios, could be rendered unlikely because of the horrible nature of the 
scenarios. It is thus by all means possible that the actual reader will resist stepping into 
the role of the narratee in order to do the bidding of the narrator and imagine the scenes 
asked for in this part of the title story.  
However, Holland’s reading is not completely gratuitous. There are certainly 
narrative strategies that invite the reader to step into the role of the narratee in this 
interview. The conversational style created by the interview structure is one, the fact that 
the reader is required to participate actively in the narrative from the very beginning in 
order to deduce the questions asked is another. Nevertheless, just as was the case with 
“Octet”, whether or not the reader accepts the invitation ultimately depends on the choice 
this actual reader makes. If the actual reader chooses to step into the role of the narratee 
here, which the conversational style and the accompanying need for active reader 
participation appear to invite, she too is asked to imagine these truly gruesome situations. 
When the man asks his narratee to imagine being the victim of a gang-rape, what he is 
actually doing is asking the narrate to make use of her theory of mind ability in order to 
experience projective empathy as she imagines herself in the situation described. Boswell 
mentions how the second-person pronoun in interview #46 “suddenly also refers to the 
reader inside the text, a reader who, as Wallace declares in ‘Octet,’ the text wants urgently 
to interrogate and whose powers of empathy it wants to challenge” (194). Who Boswell’s 
“reader inside the text” actually refers to is, to the best of my knowledge, not entirely 
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clear, and the same reservations that I brought up in connection to Smith’s reference to 
Wallace’s alleged intentions above could be brought up here as well. That being said, if 
presuming that “the reader inside the text” is the actual reader, which the reference to 
“Octet” would seem to suggest, his description indicates that Boswell as an actual reader 
did feel addressed by the imperatives directed to the second-person pronoun when reading 
this narrative. The urge from “Octet” thus seems to resonate through the collection, and 
if the actual reader does what is asked for by the narrator in “Octet” – if she steps into the 
role of the second-person pronoun in these narratives – her ability for empathy is greatly 
challenged. 
 A second interview in which the narrator asks the narratee to experience both 
allocentric and projective empathy is the already much discussed interview #20. After the 
man in the story has described how the raped and very nearly murdered woman was able 
to soothe the psychotic rapist during the actual rape, he invites his listener to “[i]magine 
being able to console someone as he weeps over what he’s doing to you as you console 
him” (313). He thus asks the interviewer (and the actual reader, if, as argued, she plays 
along in this game of perspective-taking) to use her theory of mind ability in order to 
experience projective empathy as she imagines herself in the position of the rape victim. 
Just as was the case in interview #46, the scenario the man is asking his narratee to 
imagine is both extreme and immensely challenging. During the retelling of the rape 
scenario, the man also asks his narratee to experience allocentric empathy as he asks her 
to consider “the kind of surreal sensuous clarity she was experiencing in her state of total 
focus”, and then to “imagine what this must have felt like for her, being raped in the 
gravel by a weeping psychotic whose knife’s butt jabs you on every thrust” (309). Here, 
the man does not simply ask his narratee to imagine what she would feel in such a dreadful 
situation, but actually to imagine what it must have felt like for some other particular 
individual. As discussed in chapter 3.4, the capacity to experience this type of empathy is 
a capacity granted very few characters in Brief Interviews, due to its high demands on 
other-directedness. The type of empathy asked for by the man in this interview can thus 
be regarded as a specifically challenging type of empathy. Therefore, if the actual reader 
chooses to participate in the game of perspective-taking and imagines herself as a narratee 
who follows the instructions of the narrator, the actual reader’s capability to empathize is 
put through a very demanding test. 
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 Just as was also the case in interview #46, the man in interview #20 frequently 
asks his narratee to widen her view of the world and consider arguments she most likely 
would not want to consider at first. After the man has drawn a parallel between the 
psychotic rapist’s troubled relation to female individuals and his own habit of picking up 
women for one-night encounters, he tells his narratee that he is “inviting you to consider 
that it isn’t the motivation that’s the psychotic part” (304, emphasis in the original). What 
the narrator suggests is that his own and the psychotic rapist’s behavior is based on the 
very same fear of “connection”, and that this fear leads them both to victimize women, 
albeit in different ways (304). Thus, just as this man has come to empathize with the 
psychotic rapist and to see the human commonality that connects him with the most 
hideous of men through the woman’s narrative, he invites his narratee to recognize this 
underlying and basic human commonality as well. If the actual reader accepts the role of 
the addressee, here as elsewhere, she too is invited to acknowledge this human 
commonality through empathizing with a man she would not initially want to empathize 
with. As Leake observes in his investigation of difficult empathy, empathy for characters 
who initially “resist reader empathy” is challenging precisely because it is “pushing 
identification with and recognition of disturbing qualities that we share with others, 
qualities that are common to humanity and do not represent the best of us” (175, 177-78). 
If this narrative succeeds in its evocation of empathy, the actual reader has passed what 
can be called the ultimate empathy test. If passing, she is also invited to consider an 
underlying human commonality through acknowledging basic human qualities she might 
share with a violent and brutal rapist.  
To summarize, the use of the second person-pronoun in Brief Interviews – 
particularly when accompanied by the use of imperatives – calls for active reader 
participation. Such participation, however, has to be preceded by an active choice made 
by the actual reader to participate in the game of “what if” and perspective-taking that 
these narratives invite to. The actual reader of these narratives that use the second-person 
pronoun has to recognize herself as the potential addressee of the “you” in order to step 
into the narratee’s subject position and then, if the narratives are successful in their calls 
for empathy, recognize the similarities between herself and the fictional character 
addressed by the second-person pronoun. If such reader participation takes place, if the 
reader joins the game of perspective-taking and steps into the role of the second-person 
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pronoun addressed, the collection can also function as a test of the actual reader’s capacity 
for empathy and theory of mind, as a great part of the stories’ imperatives are calls for 
theory of mind usage and perspective-widening. Due to the exceptionally abominable 
particulars of the situations the narratee is asked to imagine, they can be regarded as 
considerably difficult tests of the actual reader’s capacity for empathy through 
perspective-taking.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Through close attention to how empathy is portrayed in Brief Interviews, my analysis has 
shown that to regard empathy as inherently positive is insufficient as it precludes 
important aspects of empathy. The most significant of these aspects is that even evidently 
hideous characters might be great empathizers, a disclosure which illustrates that the 
capability to empathize can be used for a wide range of purposes, not necessarily either 
positive or ethically admirable. Rather, a well-developed capacity for empathy and theory 
of mind can facilitate cruel manipulations and obstruct human relationships. I have 
furthermore analyzed the possible vocative effect of the second-person pronoun, both in 
the collection’s second-person narratives and in a selection of the stories directing 
imperatives to an intradiegetic narratee. Through this analysis, I have illustrated the 
importance of the interpretative choice the actual reader makes for these narratives to be 
successful in their evocation of empathy.  
The choice the actual reader is invited to make – must make if the narratives are 
to be successful in inducing narrative empathy – as well as the possible consequences of 
this choice might be best described with a parallel to an incident in one of the collection’s 
stories. In interview #20 of “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men”, the man retelling the 
brutal story of the woman he has fallen in love with describes how, while listening to her 
narrative, he “remembered weeping at movies about animals as a child, even though some 
of these animals were predators and hardly what you would consider sympathetic 
characters” (312). This description of predators could just as well have been a description 
of the majority of the characters in Brief Interviews, who are, indeed, hardly what you 
would consider sympathetic characters. Furthermore, the activity the man remembers 
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while listening to the captivating narrative, i.e. empathizing with unsympathetic 
characters, could also function as a description of what the actual reader of Brief 
Interviews is invited to do throughout the collection.  
If the stories in Wallace’s collection are to be successful in their evocation of 
empathy, the real flesh-and-blood reader must, as argued, make an effortful choice to 
make use of her theory of mind ability and empathize with unsympathetic characters 
despite – or perhaps because of – their hideousness. She has to seriously consider the 
invitation to empathize with unsympathetic characters and what consequences such 
empathizing might have. Again, this is not necessarily an inherently positive activity. 
What such empathizing is, however, is an important aid for the actual reader to recognize 
human commonality. If the actual reader of Brief Interviews chooses to participate in the 
game of perspective-taking and empathizing encouraged by, among other things, the use 
of second-person narration and imperatives directed to an intradiegetic narratee, she is 
also invited to recognize a basic and underlying human commonality shared by herself 
and these characters she would hardly call sympathetic. To acknowledge an idea of 
human commonality would be valuable for the actual reader in the “ordinary acts of daily 
life” Hogan spoke of as possibly benefitting from narrative empathy (Affective 246), 
because it would lessen the doubt expressed in “Octet”: “whether other people deep inside 
experience things in anything like the same way you do” (160). If the actual reader 
considers the invitation to experience narrative empathy for the highly unlikable 
characters in the stories, she is also invited to consider these characters as not only 
hideous, but as affined with the actual reader herself. With such a consideration comes an 
acknowledging of human commonality, as the reader is invited to consider the fact that 
she might share basic, human, traits with these characters initially regarded as so different. 
Narrative empathy for unsympathetic characters can thus serve as a means capable of 
making the reader acknowledge human commonality.   
Such an acknowledging is certainly demanding for the actual reader, and it 
certainly calls for active reader participation. That Wallace’s fiction calls for active reader 
participation is, not surprising when considering his often demanding narrative 
techniques, a well-established fact in the field of Wallace studies today. What needs to be 
further investigated, however, is the way in which such reader participation affects the 
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creation of narrative empathy. As shown throughout my analysis, a one-sided view of 
empathy where the concept is evaluated in ethical terms and regarded as inherently 
positive neglects to consider several crucial aspects of empathy, both narrative and “real”. 
In order to understand a comprehensive picture of how empathy functions, it is necessary 
to move away from discussions of empathy as an inherently ethical phenomenon and 
apply a more open-minded, less ethically confined, manner of considering empathy. It is 
necessary to take into consideration that there are different kinds of empathy and that 
even empathy with unsympathetic characters can have merits. In applying such a nuanced 
approach, new questions and hitherto unexplored areas of investigation, both within 
Wallace studies and empathy research, will arise.  
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